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On Individual Relations

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In the first part of this paper* I submit some general remarks on individual relations, which are a special case of individual properties (individual accidents, concrete properties). Under different presentations the notion of individual property has been very persistent throughout the entire history of ontology. Still, one wonders about its justification. Individual properties have been intended to provide a “real foundation” for our predications. Commendable as this plan is, the notion of individual property appears too vague and questionable, and, in the special case of individual relations, just hopeless. Dismissal of individual relations, however, should not necessarily lead to the denial of the reality of relational states of affairs or relational facts (these phrases used in the very general sense of what is presented to us by a relational statement or sentence).

The second part of the paper is devoted to the presentation of examples from the past and recent history of ontology. Most examples are drawn from the “second scholastics” (post-mediaeval, Neuzetl); but the particular choice of authors within this period is rather arbitrary.

1. Individual relations: a nonsensical notion

In the history of ontology many thinkers have considered “universals” as “meaning” of predications. There has been also a parallel inclination to associate with the “meaning” of predications certain individual, concrete objects in space and time, that are not the objects of which the predicates are said but are “in” them. For example, ‘human’ and ‘white’ point not only to a unique “universal” (humanity, whiteness) but also to many concrete humanities and whitenesses “in” each of the objects of which those predications are said truly. The true sentences ‘Socrates is human’, ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Plato is human’ and ‘Plato

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is white’ involve in their meaning a universal, unique humanity, a universal, unique whiteness, as well as four concrete additional entities: the humanity in Socrates, the humanity in Plato, the white in Socrates, the white in Plato. These additional entities are “in” Socrates and “in” Plato and should not be identified with them. Even the humanity in Socrates (or the humanity in Plato) is to be distinguished from the total individual Socrates (or Plato), although for such “essential” predicates the differences between their individual instantiations and the objects (Socrates, Plato) may tend to vanish.

To choose one term, I will call the concrete instantiations of the predicates in the objects individual properties. There are of course equivalent terminologies. The traditional phrase “individual accident” is more popular but is unnecessarily restrictive, as it excludes the individual realizations of “essential” predicates.

While universals have been invented to account for the constant patterns that recur in the many instances in which one and the same predicate is truly applied, individual properties have been considered in order to explain why a particular predication, say “a is P” is “really” true. The truth of “a is P” seems to call for there being in the object a some sort of individual instantiation of P, a particular P “inhering in” the object a. The predication “a is P” is true “because” of an individual realization of P being “in” the object a.

The intention of understanding predication is of course legitimate and commendable. Its results, however, are controversial. This is notorious for universals but holds equally for individual properties. Individual properties may have appeared as less controversial than universals just because of an illusion that ontologists have entertained in their regard, namely the belief that individual properties are sensible objects — objects that one can see, touch or otherwise perceive.

It is obvious, however, that the alleged “examples” of individual properties (this white, this circle...) make sense only relative to our naive, immediate perception. There seems to be an individual white in the snow. But as soon as we look beyond this naive experience the alleged individual property either vanishes or becomes an object on its own.

At best, the alleged examples of individual properties can be construed as symbols of an X that we believe must be somehow “in” the object in order to provide a foundation for our predications. The existence of this X, the individual property itself, remains however problematic.

In the case of relational predications, of the form “a R b” (for example “David is the father of Solomon”) the corresponding individual property is not only problematic but altogether nonsensical. The reason is that individual

1 I fail to see how KÜNG can construe his “concrete relations” (= individual relations) to which he refers as a subclass of his “concrete properties” (= individual properties). See his Ontology, subject-index “relations-concrete” as well as his Concrete Properties.
relations (as I will say instead of “individual properties for relational predicates”) should inhere in the two related objects (this double-inherence condition seems to me essential: otherwise the difference between individual properties for relations and for non-relational predicates would be lost). Thus, an individual relation would be a monstrous entity stretching from one subject to the other and each related couple in the world would become an instance of Siamese twins.

Besides, there is nothing in our immediate experience that we might view as at least a symbol of the desired individual relation, in the way in which this white or this circle can be considered. All we perceive between, say, David and Solomon is air.

Two ways of avoiding the requirement of double inherence for individual relations have been conceived. Neither is in my view satisfactory.

1) One move consists in “splitting” the desired individual relation $R_{a,b}$ (aplying between $a$ and $b$) into two individual properties $R_a$, $R_b$, one inhering in $a$, the other in $b$. The objection to this proposal is that $R_a$ or $R_b$ singly taken are indistinguishable from an individual property for non-relational predicates. $R_a$ would be an individual property for a predicate such as “$x$ stands to $b$ in $R$”, $R_b$ for “$a$ stands to $x$ in $R$”. Neither would be, however, the expected individual relation.

It could be argued that the set or ordered pair $(R_a, R_b)$ is the desired individual relation. In behalf of this view it could be claimed that the couple $(R_a, R_b)$ is what provides a “real foundation” for the truth of our relational predication “$a R b$” and hence deserves being identified with the desired individual relation.

The obvious objection against this new proposal is that the couple $(R_a, R_b)$, if taken as many, is not one individual: its two members can be physically or geographically very far apart from one another. On the other hand, the couple taken as one hardly seems to be the real, concrete individual we want to play the role of an individual property.

It is better to view the couple $(R_a, R_b)$ as a partial description of a relation rather than as an unconvinging individual relation. The description consists in listing some of the ingredients that seem to characterize the state of affairs. There are other choices, for example the pair $(a, b)$, the triple $(a, R_a, b)$, the quadruple $(a, R_a, R_b, b)$.

3) Another, more radical way of overcoming the double inherence problem is to claim that relations do not inhere at all, that relations are, contrary to the other accidents of the Aristotelian categories, not in, but towards something, pro sti, ad aliquid. Here the reply is straightforward: the towards view of relations does not help at all in the task of constructing individual relations. It is more difficult to make sense of an “individual towards” than of double inherence.

That the project of constructing individual relations is a failure should not be taken as a reason to adhere to a subjectivist philosophy of relations. The evidence that the states of affairs presented to us by many relational predications “$a R b$” are real should not be shaken by the negative answer to the issue of individual relations, or as we may also say, by the non-reality of relations. Some relational states of affairs are evidently real, although relations are not real — in the sense that there are no individual relations.

2. Examples from the history of ontology

Hardly anyone seems to have endorsed the “Siamese twins” philosophy of relations. Aquinas reports that some had: quidam dixerunt quod eadem numero ratio est in utroque exterrum, but he hurries to point out that this is an absurd view: non potest esse quia unum accidens non est in duobus subjectis.

This rejection of the notion of an individual property (accident) inhering in more than one subject has often been associated with the prohibition, for single individual properties, of “traveling” from one subject to another. The latter may be regarded as perhaps a stronger version of the former: not only multiple inherence is prohibited, but also successive inherence in different subjects is ruled out.

In either form, the basic idea that individual properties cannot be attached to more than one subject has played an important role in the history of ideas. We find it as a premiss in such different contexts as Leibniz’s argument for the ideality of space and Don Ferrante’s argument against the existence of con-

4 In KREMPHEL, Relation, p. 299 (from I. Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2)
6 GP, VII p. 401 (= quatreème réponse à CLARKE 47): “Car deux sujets differents, comme A et B, ne sauroient avoir precisement la meme affection individuelle, un meme accident individuel ne se pouvant trouver en deux sujets, ny passer de sujet en sujet”. Here we find the two principles or the two versions of the same principle: 1) individual accidents cannot migrate, 2) individual accidents cannot be in more than one subject. It is surprising to see in a recent study of LEIBNIZ the remark that “Leibniz has no good ground for believing that there is something contradictory about accidents having two subjects” (BISHIGURO, Leibniz, p. 105). As BURKHARDT, Anmerkungen, p. 54, rightly points out, “Leibniz hat einen sehr guten Grund”. Also AQUINAS has a good ground when he rejects accidents in two subjects (cf. note 4). It is not that there is a logical impossibility in individual accidents being in more than one subject; simply, it is nonsense to imagine the same (numerically) individual accident in two
tagious diseases in Manzoni’s *Promessi Sposi*⁷. A certain entity cannot exist because if it existed it would be an individual accident inhering in more than one subject (Leibniz) or an individual accident migrating from one subject to another (Manzoni).

Some scholastics tried to allow the existence of accidents that are in more than one subject. Such accidents were called discrete accidents (for example relations, sets, numbers). As I understand it, if this doctrine has to avoid falling into the Siamese twins situation or into the absurd double or multiple inherence, it must construe a discrete accident as a collection of individual accidents, each of which singly inheres in a subject (a “partial” subject)⁸. The question then arises of whether this collection of individual accidents deserves being called an individual accident at all. The answer of course depends on what the ontologist expects from an individual property: the notion is vague enough to allow for different approaches. It seems preferable, however, to view the collection of individual accidents (if taken seriously at all) not as an individual accident again but rather as a partial list of items that make up a state of affairs.

In spite of being officially rejected, the Siamese twins temptation persists through the history of ontology, in more or less disguised forms. I think that it can be recognized in Ingarden. Ingarden offers a complicated diagram to express his analysis of relations⁹. The diagram reminds us of a suspension bridge. A line different places at the same time or to let it grow and stretch from one subject to the other (the two subjects may be thousands of miles away). This should be obvious to anyone who knows that individual accidents are individuals, not abstract entities outside of space and time.

I owe this reference to W. DEGEN. In MANZONI’S novel, the scholarly priest Don Ferrante argues that there cannot be any peste o contagio because to exist it should be either a substance or an accident; it is obviously not a substance nor can it be an accident: “ora supponendo l’accidente, verrebbe a essere un accidente trasportato, due parole che fanno ai calci, non essendoci in tutta la filosofia cosa più chiara, più liquida di questa: che un accidente non può passar da un soggetto all’altro” (*Promessi Sposi*, ch. 37).

GOCLENIUS allows for the possibility of contagious disease but then he explains that the disease that passes from one body to another is not the same individual accident: “Unum et idem numero seu individuo accidentis, in diversis subjectis esse nequit ... Nee idem numero morbus ex uno in alium transplantiatur: ut pestis, quae contagione contrahitur et transfunditur, non esse individuo numero in duobus corporibus, sed eadem specie, ut loquuntur”, *Problemata*, II, 50. Incidentally, we observe how GOCLENIUS refers to the impossibility of one accident being in two subjects rather than of one accident traveling from one subject to another.

⁷ Cf. my Studies, ch. 10, notes 105, 106. Also, for example, ALAMANNUS in his *Summa I*: *subjecta partialia* (p. 188, p. 191); number is an accident in *pluralibus subjectis*. The *Complutenses* similarly refer to number as having a discrete essence: it exists in *pluralibus subjectis inaequativi et partialibus* (p. 544).

⁸ R. INGARDEN, *Streit II*, 55. I owe this reference to BARRY SMITH. I am grateful to PETER SIMONS for helpful remarks concerning INGARDEN’S philosophy of relations as stated in INGARDEN’S *Relations*.

between the two pillars represents the core (Band, Kern) of the relation. Naturally the line can be meant in a sense not implying Siamese twins, as it is the case in diagrams used in algebra to represent lattices or other relations. Ingarden’s references to the “core” of the relation suggest, however, something stronger than that. The “core” seems to become an individual relation and the relational Sächverhalt comes close to the Siamese twins.

That hardly anyone has fully or formally endorsed the Siamese twins view in the history of philosophy does not mean that almost everybody took the right approach of denying the reality of relations while defending the reality of (some or many) relational states of affairs.

Classical ontologists often – but not always – regarded the failure of the search for individual relations as an almost heretical threat against the well-established insight into the reality of order in rerum natura (= into the reality of the states of affairs presented to us by many relational predications).

Aquinas, while on the one hand rejecting as absurd the Siamese twins theory, on the other hand seems to believe that without individual relations we cannot save the reality of relational states of affairs. This is shown by the following two passages:

a) “Oportet in ipsis rebus ordinem quendam esse, hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur”

b) “Quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed rationis tantum. Quod quidem appareat esse fortasse falsum ex hoc quod ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad in vicem”

In order to safeguard the reality of relational states of affairs (oportet in ipsis rebus ordinem quendam esse, ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad in vicem) there must be relations in reality (in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse) and relations cannot be merely mental (rationis tantum). The latter must mean, I suppose, that there are, or rather there must be individual relations – universal relations, as all universals, exist only in anima. Hence without individual relations there are not real relational states of affairs, no real “order” among the entia in the world.

What we find here in Aquinas and in other classical ontologists is ultimately a reversal of priorities. Contrary to these authors, it must be stressed that individual relations (individual properties in general) make sense in the first place only as one tentative way of accounting for the foundation and “objective reality” of our predications. Our evidence that some of our predications have real import is the starting point, which should take priority and cannot be abandoned just because the plan of defining individual properties turns out to be unsuccessful.

11 In: KREMPEL, *Relations*, p. 496 (Pot. q. 7 a. 9).
12 In: KREMPEL, *Relations*, p. 497 (Sum. Theo. 1, q. 13 a 17)
The erroneous reversal of priorities generates a false dilemma: either Siamese twins philosophy of relations or negation of the reality of relational states of affairs. Both alternatives being unpleasant, the classical ontologists who were victimized by the dilemma tried to overcome it. One hybrid, unfortunate result of such efforts was the doctrine that may be called "the fourth entity theory of relations". This can be represented as follows:

where 1 is the subjectum (David), 2 the terminus (Solomon), 3 the fundamentum (whatever in David makes him father of Solomon), 4 the relation itself. Items 1 and 2 are individual substances, 3 is an individual accident from a category other than relation, 4 is also an individual, in fact 4 is our individual relation. Item 4, the fourth entity, the individual relation, does not properly inhere in the fundamentum or in anything; ontologists insist that item 4 is a towards type of entity, not an inhering type of entity (in the diagram, this is suggested by the dotted lines). Still, inhering or not, the individual relation must be somehow attached to the fundamentum (must be somewhere, etc.). The fundamentum does inhere in the subjectum; the fundamentum is, as stated, an accident (individual accident) from a non-relational category (quality, quantity ...)

The supporters of the fourth entity theory tried to minimize as much as possible the reality of the fourth entity. The less real the fourth entity, the less embarrassing questions would be asked about it or about the nature of its link to the fundamentum. Thus we hear a lengthy list of phrases telling us that relations, i.e. items 4, have a minimaentitas, an ensminimum, a debileacminutissimumesse. Contrary to what happens with other individual accidents, individual relations (item 4) are not sensible: we cannot see an individual relation whereas we can see this white or this shape. For many authors the minimization clearly becomes self-destructive: item 4 ends up with having no reality of its own but only a reality "borrowed" from the fundamentum.

Such bizarre speculations can be explained only as efforts to overcome the above mentioned dilemma. The fourth entity is neither so real that Siamese twins become obvious nor so unreal that the category relation is left without individuals.

I will give now as an example a 17th century Thomist who confesses not to make sense of the fourth entity but who thinks nonetheless that the theory must be upheld in order to safeguard the reality of relational states of affairs (in his language: the reality of "order" in the outside world). Here is the text from our author, Goudin:

"Articulus II. An ratio praedicamentalis sit realiter distincta a suo fundamento.

Ratioigitpraedicamentalis nihil aliud esse, quam ordos, respectuque unius ad aliud; ordos, inquam, non ipsa rei entitatem inclusus, sed adventitious. Nunc discutendum, an ordo ille sit quid distinctum ab absoluta quo sunt in re, praepue vero a fundamentum; id est, ab illa entitatem absoluta, qua est ratio, cur unum aliud respiciat. Negant plures extranei: affirmant vero communitur utraque schola D. Thomas et Schol. Et plane, quamvis prima opinio videatur expeditior, imaginacione confirmao, eo quod imaginari non possimus, quae tandem sit illa entitas realis a fundamento scorsim suprema; attamen secunda sententia verissimilior videtur, ac rationi rerum fibras solertiae insipienti maximae convenies. Observamus enim, nos habere, non in imaginatio, sed in mentis apice, Ideam, seu notionem ordinis et relationis; illamque ideam nobis reprehendaris ordinem, non ut denominationem extrinsicam aut ut narrationem, sed ut aliquid positivum, et intrinsecum rebus ordinatis: unde, si res ex sua propria essentia ordinatur ad aliquid, ordinem illum concipimus ut rei maxime intrinsecum et positivum, non tamen a essentia realiter distinctum; quia hoc ipsum, quod est aliud respicere, est ex ratione talis essentiae. Et ideo vocamus has relations transcendentales, id est, identificatas cum essentia eius, quot reperit: Sed si res ex sua essentia..."
non ordinantur, imo, si intellectus omnibus, quae sunt in re, nullus in ea sit ordo ad aliquid; plane, ut intelligatur relata, necesse est, ut intelligamus entitatem, quam nobis repressentat. Idea ordinis, supernessse illi rei tanquam aliquid additium; proindeque distinctum, vel secundum rem, si reipsea de novo referatur, vel secundum rationem, si sola mente referatur. 

Sit itaque

Conclusio

Relatio praedicamentalis realiter distinguetur a fundamento et ab omnibus absolutis, quae sunt in re, estque entitas addititia, cuius munus est, constitui ree ordinatum ad alium.

For Goudin it is hard to make sense of the fourth entity. To this extent, he would prefer to join the negantes. On the other hand, however, there is "order" in reality; things are ordered in a way that is independent of our minds and that cannot be understood as mere extra seca denomination. Some things are essentially ordered or related to others; for such "transcendental" relations there is no need of inventing a fourth entity. But for the other, the non-essentially ordered things, Goudin cannot see how to account for their really being ordered and related except via the construction of an additional — addititia — entity: an individual relation.

The fourth entity theory was probably the most famous thesis on relations in classical ontology. The debates over the philosophy of relations mainly hinged on the existence of the fourth entity: some defended it, others denied it. The negative view developed and gained increasing support in the Jesuit century preceding Leibniz.

Many classical ontologists rejected the fourth entity but did not take this rejection as a denial of the reality of relational states of affairs. This has been often misunderstood, because critics have not distinguished between reality of relations (to be denied) and reality of relational states of affairs (to be defended).

Next I will give two examples of classical ontologists who wisely deny the reality of relations while defending the reality of relational states of affairs.

My first example is an 18th century Scotist. Our author, Carolus a Sto. Floriano, flatly rejects individual relations (the fourth entity): relatio non est aliquod accidens superadditum fundamentum proximo et termino. At the same time, however, he confidently claims that plures sunt relationes reales, quae ut sint ab actu mentis nostrae non pendent. He emphasizes that the reality of relations does not imply the existence of any additional object: admitteramus esse relationes reales, at nullo plane modo conficitur, relationem esse quidpam realiter.

The quaestio was formulated, for example, in the following terms: whether secula omni operatione intellectus, there is anything real apart from the two related things (subjectum, terminus) and the fundamentum. ARAUJO, Metaphysicam I, treatise on relations.

GOUDIN, Philosophia, Liber II, sectio III, art. 2, propositio 2. Note here "fundamento proximo" stands for "fundamento" (fundamentum remotum = subjectum).

The fourth entity has been dropped, our author tells us that the relation is the whole consisting of the two related terms; obviously, if both related terms are real, the relation is real too. Here are some of his texts:

distinctum et superadditum fundamentum proximo et termino. The phrase "relationes reales" creates a problem here. In classical ontology, for a relation to be real it must be an individual relation (universals exist only in the mind). Our author obviously does not mean this; in fact, he rejects individual relations: "real relations must be admitted, but not in the sense of postulating individual relations" — such is my free translation of the last quoted passage. In what sense should we then read the phrase "relationes reales"? It appears that what Carolus means is real states of affairs. All he wants to assert is the existence of some sentences of the form aRb such that they present to us a state of affairs that is evidently real. This can be seen in the following text:

"Plura sunt in rerum natura constituta formaliter et adequate in esse relationi, quin ut hujusmodi sint ab aliquo mentis nostrae actu dependant; nam plura sunt hact ratione constitueta in esse simili, acqualis, causae, effectus, potentiae, actus et cee. ac omnia praeter Deum in esse creaturae. Quis enim dicit pendere ab actu mentis nostrae, ut duo homines sint natura similis, ut due spheoae ejusdem diametri sint magnitudine aequales, ut ignis sit causa caloris, ut lux sit effectus Solis, ut potestia perficiatur ab actu, ut actus perficiat potentiam, ut demum res omnes sint a Deo creatae, et ab illo necessario et essentialiter dependant? Haeque quippe omnia omnia vero essent, etsi nullus humanus cogitaret intellectus.

The last sentence: "haec quippe omnia omnia vero essent..." expresses Carolus' insight: all these sentences, all these facts or states of affairs would hold even if no human mind thought of them. Carolus does not want to give up this insight just because the fourth entity or individual relations cannot be reasonably defended.

The second example of an author who rejects the fourth entity (individual relations) but who still wants to talk of real relations is the 17th century Jesuit Alphonso Malpartidensis. From the four entities he only accepts three; in his terminology they are: the fundamentum (= the subjectum), the ratio fundandi (= the fundamentum) and the terminus. At the same time he admits real relations: Relatio realis est quae reversa datur inter extrema realiter distincta ante ullam operationem intellectus illam fingen tem, ut inter patrem et filium.

If we wonder what is the real relation once the fourth entity has been dropped, our author tells us that the relation is the whole consisting of the two related terms; obviously, if both related terms are real, the relation is real too. Here are some of his texts:

Ibid., propositio 2, p. 457.

Ibid., propositio 1.

In: PEINADO, Logica, Disputationes 19, De Relatione, preface.

Ibid., sectio 1.
The distinction of the two theses: rejection of individual relations and affirmation of relational facts should solve the controversy on "Leibniz and the reality of relations".

In a recent study Muggia contrasts Leibniz's assertion of the "reality of harmony" with Leibniz's assertion of the "ideality of relations" and raises the question of their compatibility (vereinbaren). Now, if by "ideality of relations" one means denial of the existence of individual relations and by "reality of relations" one means reality of relational states of affairs or facts, then both views are compatible.

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genealogiques, quoyqu'elles exprimeroient des verites reelles ne seroient que choses ideales" (GP VII, p. 401, quatrième réponse to CLARKE, 47); "... qui fait qu'on s'imagine des places, des traces, des espaces, quoyque ces choses ne consistent que dans la vérité des rapports, et nullement dans quelque réalité absolue" (ibid., p. 402). In these three texts the adjective "real" is applied, as I understand them, to relational states of affairs rather than to relations.

HEINEKAMP, Leibniz, p. 276.

MUGNAI, Bemerkungen.


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