

International Political Economy
Fall 2011
GOV 388L

Professor Terry Chapman
Office: Batts 3.104
Office hours T/th: 1:30-3:00
Phone: 512-232-7221
Email: t.chapman@austin.utexas.edu
url: <https://webspace.utexas.edu/tlc897/>

Course Overview:

This is a Ph.D. level course on international political economy. The course is designed to give students an in-depth overview of the field, with a focus on topics that have attracted attention in recent years. The IPE field attempts to answer questions like the following: why do countries enact trade barriers? How does national interest translate into international economic policy? How do markets and governments interact? Why do countries accumulate debt and when do they default? How do international institutions condition international economic exchange?

These questions are fundamental to understanding global order and world history. The twentieth century was the bloodiest in human history, and one lesson that emerges from a close reading of the first half of that century is that the collapse of international commerce contributes to global instability. The current recession in the United States, the debt crises in Europe, and concern over the emergence of China as a major market and creditor are only some of the contemporary issues that IPE research can help us understand.

The expectations and standards for this course are high. You should be prepared for class each week and bring interesting questions to the discussion. The success of our seminar depends on active and professional participation and engagement.

Readings:

We will cover approximately four to six professional journal length articles or a book equivalent each week. Students are expected to have carefully completed the readings in advance to facilitate useful discussion. Articles can be found through the library's "ejournals" search function.

If you are planning on taking comprehensive exams in international relations, you should be familiar with, at a minimum, the required readings on the syllabus. The recommended readings are meant to provide an additional, but by no means exhaustive, list of works that can help you prepare for exams and/or generate and conduct original research.

The following books will be placed on reserve in the library. Not all are required. We will read portions of the books by Jensen, Tomz, Rodrik, Milner and Vreeland,

though in some cases we will read very limited portions. The others may be useful for further reading. You may make copies of the book on reserve or choose to purchase these for yourself from amazon.com or another vendor.

- Nathan M. Jensen, *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006)
- Michael Tomz, *Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007).
- Dani Rodrik. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- James Raymond Vreeland. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Helen V. Milner, *Resisting Protectionism* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988)
- Beth Simmons, *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld. 2006. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. New York: Pearson.
- Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2006. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Norton.
- Barry Eichengreen. 1998. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Assignments:

Weekly papers: Students are required to complete a 1-2 page reaction paper to ONE of the readings for each week. You have 3 “bye” weeks, in which you do not have to submit a paper. There are 14 weeks of class you are not required to submit a paper the first week of class, so that makes 10 reaction papers. Your reaction papers should read like a short book or article review, highlighting the key themes of the article or book chosen and pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the piece. This will be worth 20% of your grade.

Discussion leading: Students will choose a topic/week to lead discussion. Discussion leading will consist of no more than a 10 minute summary of the core theme and questions from that week and then facilitation of discussion throughout the seminar. Each student will perform this task at least once and possibly twice, given the number of presenters and weeks. This will be worth 15% of your grade.

Research design paper: Each student will select a topic and write a research design paper, due at the end of the semester. These papers should be 20-30 pages in length, written like a professional journal article, but data analysis is optional. The focus should be on carefully developing an original research question, discussing relevant literature, and developing the logic of that original question leading to the formation of a testable hypothesis. The paper should include a plan to

muster empirical evidence in order to support or refute that hypothesis. Absolutely no late papers will be accepted, pending a serious illness that physically prevents you from completing the paper, a death in the family that prevents you from completing the paper, or an otherwise legitimate life catastrophe that prevents you from completing the paper. Please notify me immediately if any of these events occurs.

Class attendance and active participation: Class attendance is required. The success of this seminar, in terms of what you get out of it, depends crucially on the active participation and input of everyone. 15% of your grade will therefore come from how actively you participate by asking questions, raising relevant points, and maintaining a respectful scholarly atmosphere.

Students with disabilities: Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities, 471-6259, <http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd/>

Course Calendar:

1. Introduction to International Political Economy – Aug. 24

David A. Lake, "[Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review](#)," *Review of International Organizations* 4 (2009), 219-244

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. The transatlantic divide: Why are American and British IPE so different? *Review of International Political Economy*, 14(2): 197-219.

Daniel Maliniak and Michael J. Tierney, "[The American School of IPE](#)," *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (2009), 6-33

Layna Mosley and David Andrew Singer, "[The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Opportunities for International Political Economy](#)," *International Interactions* 35 (2009), 420-429

Recommended:

Michael Mastanduno. 1998. Economics and security in statecraft and scholarship. *International Organization* 52(4): 825-854.

Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frieden, "[Reflections on the Causes and Consequences of the Debt Crisis of 2008](#)," La Follette Policy Report 19 (Fall 2009), 1-5

Jeffrey Frieden, "[The Political Economy of Rebalancing](#)," in *Rebalancing the Global Economy: A Primer for Policymaking*, Simon Evenett and Bernard Hoekman, eds. (World Bank and VoxEU, 2010), 149-155

Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, "[International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions](#)," in Katznelson and Milner, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (2002), 118-146

Jeffrey Frankel. 2000. "[Globalization of the Economy](#)." In *Governance in a Globalizing World*, edited by Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, pp. 45-71 (Brookings Institution Press)

David Leblang and Sonal Pandya, "[The Financial Crisis of 2007: Our Waterloo or Take a Chance on IPE?](#)", *International Interactions* 35 (2009), 430-435

2. Trade Policy Demands: Interest Groups, Pluralism, and Domestic Politics – Aug. 31

Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81:4 (December 1987), 1121-1137

Helen V. Milner, *Resisting Protectionism* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), 18-29

Michael J. Hiscox, "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade," *International Organization* 55 (Winter 2001): 1-46

Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety," *International Organization* 63 (2009), 425-457

Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade," *International Organization* 60 (Spring 2006), 469-498

Recommended:

Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2001), 267-292

Gyung-Ho Jeong, "Constituent Influence on International Trade Policy in the United States, 1987 to 2006," *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009), 519-540

Kevin H. O'Rourke and Richard Sinnott, "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence," *Brookings Trade Forum* 2001, 157-206

Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik, "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?", *European Economic Review* 49 (2005), 1393-1430

Jeffrey W. Ladewig, "Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992," *International Organization* 60 (Winter 2006), 69-103

Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt. 2000. Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 703-719.

Helen Milner. 1987. Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s. *International Organization* 41(4): 639-665.

Helen V. Milner and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy. *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 95-119.

Andy Baker. 2007. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924-938.

Michael J. Gilligan, "Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997), 455-474

Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy," *International Organization* 65 (2011), 37-68

Alexandra Guisinger, "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?", *International Organization* 63 (2009), 533-57

3. The Supply of Trade Policy: Parties, Electoral Rules, Veto Players, etc. – Sept.

7

Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization* 41:2 (Spring 1987), 203-223

Daniel Y. Kono, "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," *American Political Science Review* 100:3 (August 2006), 369-384

- Michael J. Hiscox. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53(4): 669-698.
- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833-850.
- Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga, "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," *International Organization* 63 (2009), 491-532

Recommended:

- Daniel L. Nielson, "Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 47:3 (July 2003), 470-491
- Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," *International Organization* 42:1 (Winter 1988), 179-217
- Megumi Naoi and Ellis Krauss, "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems," *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2009), 874-892
- Megumi Naoi, "Decentralization, Industrial Geography, and the Politics of Export Regulation: The Case of Sino-Japanese Trade Disputes," in Ka Zeng, ed., *China's Foreign Trade Policy: The New Constituencies* (Routledge, 2007), 40-58
- Daniel Yuichi Kono, "Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009), 885-906
- David Karol, "Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials' Trade Policy Preferences," *Journal of Politics* 69:2 (May 2007), 483-494
- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements," *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2007), 403-432
- Marc L. Busch, *Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic Policy in High Technology Competition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chs. 1-2
- Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," *International Organization* 48:4 (Autumn 1994), 595-632
- Fiona McGillivray, "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs," *American Journal of Political Science* 41:2 (April 1997), 584-607
- Stephan Haggard, "[The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934](#)," *International Organization* 42:1 (Winter 1988), 91-119 [A revisionist approach focusing on the delegation of negotiating authority to the executive branch after 1934.]
- Beth Simmons, *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3-51, 174-218

4. The Supply of Trade Policy 2: Regime Type– Sept. 14

- Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, "Democratization and Economic Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009), 163-181.

Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield, "Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Postcommunist World," *Comparative Political Studies* 37:4 (2004), 371-398.

Daniel Y. Kono, "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," *American Political Science Review* 100:3 (August 2006), 369-384

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 94:2 (June 2000), 305-321

Recommended:

Kevin H. O'Rourke and Alan M. Taylor, "Democracy and Protectionism," NBER Working Paper 12250 (May 2006)

Helen V. Milner with Keiko Kubota, "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," *International Organization* 59 (2005), 157-193

Sean D. Ehrlich, "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies," *International Organization* 61 (Summer 2007), 571-605

Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett, "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection, 1962-1989," *Journal of Politics* 60:4 (1998), 1126-47.

Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang, "Democracy and Globalization," *Economics and Politics* 20 (2008), 289-334.

David Stasavage, "Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining," *International Organization* 58 (Fall 2004), 667-703.

Alexandra Guisinger, "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?," *International Organization* 63 (2009), 533-57

**5. Power and National Security and the International Political Economy:
Market Power, Hegemony, Security Interests, and Armed
International Conflict – Sept. 21**

Christian Broda, Nuno Limao, and David E. Weinstein, "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence," *American Economic Review* 98 (2008), 2032-2065

Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim, "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-1994," *World Politics* 57 (July 2005), 453-478

Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 87:2 (June 1993), 408-420

David A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?," *International Studies Quarterly* 37:4 (December 1993), 459-489

Recommended:

Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929-1939*, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), xiii-xvi, 1-13, 288-305

Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991), 336-366

Douglas A. Irwin, *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 101-115

Omar M. G. Keshk, Brian M. Pollins, and Rafael Reuveny, "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 66:4 (November 2004), 1155-1179

Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade," *International Organization* 58 (Fall 2004), 775-805

Glen Biglaiser and Karl deRouen, Jr., "Following the Flag: Troop Deployment and US Foreign Direct Investment," *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007), 835-854

Benjamin O. Fordham, "Economic Interests and Public Support for American Global Activism," *International Organization* 62 (Winter 2008), 163-182

Andrew G. Long, "Bilateral Trade in the Shadow of Armed Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008), 81-101

Albert Hirschman. 1945. *National power and the structure of foreign trade*, pp. 3-40.

Daniel Drezner. 2003. The hidden hand of economic coercion. *International Organization* 57(3): 643-659.

6. International Institutions and trade – Sept. 28

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," *International Organization* 56:3 (Summer 2002), 477-513

Christina L. Davis. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153-169.

Andrew K. Rose. 2004. Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.

Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.

Jeff Kucik and Eric Reinhardt, "[Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime](#)," *International Organization* 62:3 (July 2008), 477-505

Recommended:

Kerry Chase. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 57: 137-174.

Robert Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. *International Organization* 57(4): 829-62.

Marc L. Bush. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *International Organization* 61(4): 735-761.

- Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, "The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice," *Annual Reviews of Economics* 2 (2010), 223-256
- Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational," *International Organization* 54:3 (Summer 2000), 457-488.
- Krzysztof J. Pelc, "Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements," *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009), 349-368
- George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?," *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996), 379-406.
- James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998), 269-305
- Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55 (2001), 761-799
- Barbara Koremenos, "Contracting Around International Uncertainty," *American Political Science Review* 99:4 (November 2005), 549-565
- Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006)
- Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998), 3-32
- Helen V. Milner, "Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems," in Darren Hawkins et al., eds., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), 107-139
- James McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," *International Organization* 54:1 (Winter 2000), 137-180
- B. Peter Rosendorff, "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure," *American Political Science Review* 99:3 (August 2005), 389-400
- B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner, "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," *International Organization* 55 (2001), 829-857
- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-17, 22-28, 63-67, 271-285
- Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-18, 68-138, optional 41-67
- Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999), 589-626

7. International Finance I: The Trilemma & Domestic Interests over Policies and Outcomes – Oct. 5

- Kenneth Scheve, "Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking," *International Organization* 58 (Winter 2004), 1-34.
- Geoffrey Garrett. 1998. Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle? *International Organization* 52(4): 787-824.
- David H. Bearce. 2003. Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes. *International Organization* 57(2): 373-410.
- William Bernhard and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53(1): 71-97

Recommended:

- Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor, "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87 (Aug 2005), 423-438
- J. Lawrence Broz, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data," *IMF Staff Papers* 55 (2008), 417-444
- J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffrey A. Frieden, "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations," *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 4 (2001): 317-343
- Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz, "Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), 703-720
- Alessandro Prati, Martin Schindler, and Patricio Valenzuela, "Who Benefits from Capital Account Liberalization? Evidence from Firm-Level Credit Ratings Data," IMF Working Paper WP/09/210, 2009
- Michael D. Bordo, "Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective," IMF Working Paper WP/03/160, 2003
- Michael W. Klein and Jay C. Shambaugh, "The Dynamics of Exchange Rate Regimes: Fixes, Floats, and Flips," *Journal of International Economics* 75 (2008), 70-92
- Helen Callaghan, "Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Corporate Governance," *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (2009), 733-762
- Stefanie Walter, "A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences," *International Organization* 62 (Summer 2008), 405-438
- Hector E. Schamis and Christopher R. Way, "Political Cycles and Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization," *World Politics* 56 (October 2003), 43-78
- Beth Simmons, *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 52-105
- Dennis P. Quinn and Carla Inclán, "The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 41:3 (July 1997), 771-813

8. Monetary Institutions – Oct. 19

- Jeffrey A. Frieden. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization* 45(4): 425-451.
- William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. *International Organization* 56(4): 693-723.
- J. Lawrence Broz. 1999. Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International incentives and the domestic free-rider problem. *International Organization* 53(1): 39-70.
- Mark Hallerberg, "Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions," *International Organization* 56:4 (Autumn 2002), 775-802
- Philip Keefer and David Stasavage, "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," *International Organization* 56:4 (Autumn 2002), 751-774

Recommended:

- Beth A. Simmons. 1996. Rulers of the Game: Central Bank Independence During the Interwar Years. *International Organization* 50(3): 407-443.
- Jeffrey A. Frieden. 1997. Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America: An Open Economy Interpretation. *Journal of Economic History* 57: 367-395.
- Bumba Mukherjee and David Andrew Singer. 2008. Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting. *International Organization* 62(2): 323-358.

9. International Finance II: Domestic & International Sources of Financial Policies and Outcomes – Oct. 12

- David H. Bearce and Mark Hallerberg, "Democracy and *De Facto* Exchange Rate Regimes," *Economics and Politics* 23 (2011), forthcoming.
- Beth A. Simmons, "The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs," *International Organization* 54:3 (Summer 2000), 573-602
- Alexandra Guisinger and David Andrew Singer, "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility," *International Organization* 64 (2010), 313-337
- David H. Bearce, "Not Complements, But Substitutes: Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments, Central Bank Independence, and External Currency Stability," *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008), 807-824
- Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy," *American Political Science Review* 98:1 (February 2004), 171-189
- Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom. *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 261-276.

Recommended:

- J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Plouffe, "The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence," *International Organization* 64 (2010), 695-717
- Cameron G. Thies and Moises Arce, "The Politics of Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization Versus Structural Reforms in Latin America," *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (2009), 1193-1216
- David Stasavage and Dominique Guillaume, "When Are Monetary Commitments Credible? Parallel Agreements and the Sustainability of Currency Unions," *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002), 119-146
- William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Political Parties and Monetary Commitments," *International Organization* 56:4 (Autumn 2002), 803-830
- David Andrew Singer, "Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World," *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010), 307-323
- David Andrew Singer, "Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization," *International Organization* 58 (2004), 531-565
- John Gerald Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36:2 (Spring 1982), 195-231
- Eric Helleiner, *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 1-17, 21-50, 146-168, 195-209

10. Multinational Corporations & International Investment – Oct. 26

- Nathan M. Jensen, *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006), chs. 1, 2, 3, 5
- Pablo M. Pinto and Santiago M. Pinto, "The Politics of Investment: Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment," *Economics and Politics* 20:2 (June 2008), 216-254
- Tim Buthe and Helen V. Milner, "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2008), 741-762.
- Andrew Kerner. 2009. Why should I believe you? The costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties. *International Studies Quarterly* 53(1): 73-102.

Recommended:

- Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons, "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000," *International Organization* 60 (Fall 2006), 811-846
- Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, "Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions," *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010), 1-26

- Quan Li and Adam Resnick, "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries," *International Organization* 57 (Winter 2003), 175-211
- Quan Li, "Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 68 (Feb 2006), 62-74
- David Stasavage, "Private Investment and Political Institutions," *Economics and Politics* 14 (March 2002), 41-63
- Theodore H. Moran, *Foreign Direct Investment and Development* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), 15-25
- David Leblang, "Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora Networks and International Investment," *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010), 584-600
- Shannon Lindsey Blanton and Robert G. Blanton, "What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment," *Journal of Politics* 69:1 (February 2007), 143-155

11. The Politics of Sovereign Borrowing and Debt and Financial Crises – Nov. 2

- David Stasavage, "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785," *International Organization* 61 (Summer 2007), 489-525
- Michael Tomz, *Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), ch. 1
- David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath, "Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises," *International Organization* 60 (Winter 2006), 245-262.
- Candace C. Archer, Glen Biglaiser, and Karl deRouen, Jr., "Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World?," *International Organization* 61 (Spring 2007), 341-365
- Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," *International Organization* 57 (Winter 2003), 3-42.

Recommended:

- Thomas Oatley, "Political Institutions and Foreign Debt in the Developing World," *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010), 175-195
- Anthony Peter Spanakos and Lucio R. Renno, "Speak Clearly and Carry a Big Stock of Dollar Reserves," *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (2009), 1292-1316
- Andrew K. Rose and Mark M. Spiegel, "A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and Credit," *IMF Staff Papers* 51 (2004), 50-63
- Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart, "Fixing for Your Life," *Brookings Trade Forum 2000* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001), 1-57
- Guillermo A. Calvo and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17:4 (Fall 2003), 99-118
- Barry Eichengreen, "Historical Perspectives on International Lending and Debt," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5:2 (Spring 1991), 149-169

- Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, "This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," working paper, 2008
- Philip Keefer, "Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis," *International Organization* 61 (Summer 2007), 607-641
- Andrew MacIntyre, "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia," *International Organization* 55:1 (Winter 2001), 81-122
- David Leblang and William Bernhard, "The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies," *International Organization* 54:2 (Spring 2000), 291-324
- Will H. Moore and Bumba Mukherjee, "Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence from Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006), 93-118
- David Leblang, "To Devalue or Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003), 533-559

12. International Institutions and Multilateral Lending & Conditionality – Nov. 9

- Randall W. Stone, "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 98:4 (November 2004), 577-591
- Randall W. Stone. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. *International Organization* 62(4): 589-620.
- Mark S. Copelovitch, "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending," *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010), 49-77
- Bumba Mukherjee and David Andrew Singer, "International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2010), 45-60.
- J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes, "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund," *International Organization* 60 (Spring 2006), 367-399

Recommended:

- James Raymond Vreeland, "The International and Domestic Politics of IMF Programs," working paper, October 2005
- Martin C. Steinwand and Randall W. Stone, "The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent Evidence," *Review of International Organization* 3 (2008), 123-149
- Erica R. Gould, "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," *International Organization* 57 (Summer 2003), 551-586
- Irfan Nooruddin and Joel W. Simmons, "The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending," *International Organization* 60 (Fall 2006), 1001-1033
- James Raymond Vreeland, *The IMF and Economic Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

- Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 62:2 (August 2000), 385-421
- Silvia Marchesi, "Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of Development Economics* 70 (2003), 403-423
- Strom C. Thacker, "The High Politics of IMF Lending," *World Politics* 51:1 (October 1999), 38-75
- Thomas Oatley, "Why is Stabilization Sometimes Delayed? Reevaluating the Regime-Type Hypothesis," *Comparative Political Studies* 37:3 (April 2003), 286-312
- Dani Rodrik, "Why Is There Multilateral Lending?," NBER Working Paper 5160, June 1995
- Jong-Wha Lee and Kwanho Shin, "IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard," *Journal of International Money and Finance* 27 (2008), 816-830
- William Easterly, "What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans," *Journal of Development Economics* 76 (2005), 1-22

13. economic development – Nov. 16

- Dani Rodrik. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- James Raymond Vreeland. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-77, 152-166.
- Helen V. Milner. 2005. Globalization, development, and international institutions: Normative and positive perspectives. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(4): 833-854.

Recommended

- Barry R. Weingast. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11(1): 1-33.
- William Easterly. 2003. Can foreign aid buy growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(3): 23-48.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith. 2007. Foreign aid and policy concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2): 251-284.
- Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2007. The effects of US Foreign Assistance on democracy building, 1990-2003. *World Politics* 59(3): 404-440

****Nov. 23 (no class – thanksgiving)****

14. – Nov. 30 foreign aid and sanctions as economic statecraft

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith. 2008. A political economy of aid. *International Organization* 63(2): 309-340.
- Arthur A. Goldsmith. 2003. Foreign aid and statecraft in Africa. *International Organization* 55(1): 123-148.

Jonathan Kirshner. 1997. The microfoundations of economic sanctions. *Security Studies* 6(3): 32-64.

Daniel Drezner. 2003. The hidden hand of economic coercion. *International Organization* 57(3): 643-659.

Recommended:

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith. 2007. Foreign aid and policy concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2): 251-284.

Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2007. The effects of US Foreign Assistance on democracy building, 1990-2003. *World Politics* 59(3): 404-440

Robert A. Pape. 1997. Why economic sanctions do not work. *International Security* 22(2): 90-136.

Daniel Drezner. 1998. Conflict expectations and the paradox of economic coercion. *International Studies Quarterly* 42(4): 709-731.

Daniel Drezner. 2000. Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive?. *International Organization* 54(1): 73-102.

Nikolay Marinov. 2005. Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders? *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 564-576.