

The University of Texas at Austin
Professor Jim Enelow (jenelow@austin.utexas.edu)
BAT 3.102, Office hrs: M,W 10-1130

GOV 341M
Fall 2011
M,W 330-500
WEL 2.312

DECISION THEORY

Required Reading

Joel Watson, STRATEGY: An Introduction to Game Theory. 2nd edition. W.W. Norton, 2008.

Below each reading are a chapter number and a list of exercises, which can be found at the end of the chapter. It is strongly recommended that these exercises be attempted before they are done in class. Parts of the Appendix (App) are also assigned.

Exams

There will be three in-class multiple-choice exams covering material from each of the three sections of the course. Each exam is of the problem-solving type, similar to the SAT math exam. There is no final exam and no extra credit. A make-up exam (not multiple-choice) will be given only if an exam is missed for a valid reason.

Grades

The first two exams will have 20 questions, the third 16 questions. Each question is worth one point. The points you receive on the three exams are added together to determine your total score. These scores will be curved to determine your final grade, approximating as closely as possible the following distribution: 25% A's, 30% B's, 25% C's, 15% D's and 5% F's. A plus/minus grading system will be used.

Students with disabilities: Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities, 471-6259, www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd/

Assignments

DATE	TOPIC	READINGS
AUG 24,29	Game Theory	Chs. 1-2 2: 1,4,6,7 App 365-7
AUG 31	Strategies and the Normal Form	Ch. 3 3: 1,2,3,4,7 App 367-8
SEP 7	Mixed Strategies and Expected Payoffs	Ch. 4 4: 1,2,3,4 App 371-6

SEP 12	Dominance and Best Response	Chs. 5-6 6: 1,2,4,5,6,7
SEP 14	Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance	Ch. 7 & 77-80 7: 1,2,3,4,7
SEP 19,21	Nash Equilibrium	Ch. 9 & 112-117 9: 1,2,3,4,6,7
SEP 26	REVIEW	
SEP 28	FIRST EXAM	
OCT 3,5	Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium	Ch. 11 11: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11
OCT 10,12	Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection	Chs. 14-15 15: 1,2,3,5,6
OCT 17	Bargaining Games	Ch. 19 19: 3,6,8
OCT 19,24	Repeated Games	Ch. 22 22: 1,2,3,5
OCT 26	REVIEW	
OCT 31	SECOND EXAM	
NOV 2,7,9	Incomplete Information	Ch. 24, 312-13, 320-322, 327-332 24: 1,2,3; 26: 1,3,6,7,8,9
NOV 14,16,21	Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium	Chs. 28-29 28: 1,2,3,4,6,8; 29: 1,2,3,4,5,7
NOV 28	REVIEW	
NOV 30	THIRD EXAM	