Party Politics during the Louisiana Purchase

The powerful personalities of Thomas Jefferson and Napoléon dominate Louisiana Purchase narratives. Such a focus obscures the important institutional, electoral, and partisan dynamics that help explain the transfer of Louisiana to the United States. This article offers new insight into relationships between the Federalists and the Republicans as well as the institutional relationship between Congress and the president. During the purchase, both political parties at times sacrificed the consistency of their issue positions on the altar of electoral politics. The politicians' actions were based not only on their personalities and partisan affiliations but also on their institutional contexts. By additionally considering the partisan and institutional dynamics of the early 1800s, this article provides a more complete understanding of the Louisiana Purchase.

When Napoléon sold Louisiana to the United States, he transformed the future of North America and the world. The purchase nearly doubled the size of the United States. From it came the states of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota (also the lion’s share of Colorado, Minnesota, and Wyoming). The Louisiana Purchase was larger than the combined areas—at that time—of Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy (Sloane 1904). Although the area was sparsely populated (Lewis 1903: 112), those 13 states now contain roughly 35 million people (almost 13 percent of the current U.S. population).

Historians have greatly appreciated this critical turning point in American history. They have scoured the newspapers, delved into the personal...
diaries, and studied the official documents to weave together compelling and interesting narratives. The Louisiana Purchase has not yet been analyzed, however, from a social scientific perspective. That the former is true is not extraordinary; that the latter is true is. At the time of the purchase, the adolescent United States was only in its 14th year of operating under the Constitution. The political institutions in the federal government were still taking shape. The case establishing the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review, *Marbury v. Madison*, was decided only eight months before the purchase was complete (see McCloskey 1960 and Corwin 1981–88 for more about the early development of judicial review). Congress had not yet begun delegating bills—or power for that matter—to standing committees (see Cooper 1971; Gamm and Shepsle 1989; and Smith and Deering 1990 for thorough and interesting discussions of the development of the committee system). Presidents were vetoing only legislation they thought was unconstitutional, not legislation they opposed on political grounds (see Cameron 2000 for a discussion of vetoes). And political parties—James Madison’s feared “factions”—were 29 years away from even holding their first national conventions—the Democrats held the first national convention in 1832 to renominate Andrew Jackson for president (see Aldrich 1995 on party development). Put simply, the federal government acted and interacted in a way unrecognizable to today’s political observers.

By the end of Jackson’s second term in 1837, everything had changed. The Supreme Court was overturning legislative actions, Congress was delegating work to standing committees, presidents were vetoing legislation on political grounds, and political parties were orchestrating action within not only Congress but also the electorate. Indeed, the interactions of the federal government in 1837 more closely resemble the interactions of our government today than the government of George Washington’s day.

Political scientists have analyzed the first few Congresses to understand the formation of the party system in the United States (Hoadley 1980; Aldrich and Grant 1993; Aldrich 1995). Jumping ahead 30 years, they have also thoroughly investigated the full functioning of political parties in the Jacksonian era (McCormick 1966; Aldrich 1995). But while political biographies and detailed monographs about the important political events in the intervening years abound, there is a dearth of social science analysis focused on the events of the early nineteenth century. The Louisiana Purchase provides fertile ground for analyzing the transition from a colonial government to a
modern-day democracy. The findings from this article demonstrate that by the end of the Louisiana Purchase debate, the parties had fully entered the electoral arena, where they have stayed ever since. To appreciate the impact of electoral considerations on the political parties, this article compares the legislative party activities during the Louisiana Purchase to party activities during the Jay Treaty in Washington’s second term. Between 1796 and 1803 Thomas Jefferson and his followers abandoned principle, made blank the paper of the Constitution, and reversed their sworn ideology. But Jefferson and his Republicans were not alone in these political flip-flops. The Federalists began the partisan position swapping with their strident support of the western settlers after Spain revoked the right of deposit in New Orleans. Both parties, so it would seem, sacrificed political principles on the altar of electoral politics. The Federalists lost the political battle when their electoral fortunes plummeted after the purchase; however, they won the ideological war when Jefferson’s Republican Party, through the Louisiana Purchase, adopted a de facto philosophy of expanding the national government’s powers at the expense of the state governments (Cerami 2003).

Although the mass-based organizations were still several presidential elections away, the political parties’ actions during the debate on Louisiana are best understood by incorporating electoral politics into the existing narratives. This argument requires two caveats. First, electoral politics were not the parties’ only motivation. Our existing understanding of the parties’ functioning during the Louisiana Purchase is not wrong; it is just more complete if we take seriously the parties’ electoral considerations. Second, the Louisiana Purchase is not the first time parties thought of the electoral consequences of their actions; indeed, the debates over the Jay Treaty, when party formation began in earnest, were replete with considerations of popular response. Further, the Louisiana Purchase parties did not combine policy with electoral strategy in the same way that parties do today. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Purchase debate presents, for one of the first times in American history, political parties abandoning issue positions for the hope of electoral rewards.

Party politics, of course, were not the only game in town. Members of Congress had other considerations when casting their roll call votes. First, members expressed institutional loyalty. As the institutions of the national government matured, members frequently cast votes in favor of the institutional interests of Congress over the president, even when the president was a member of their party. Second, the results support James Sterling Young’s
boardinghouse thesis that the members’ mess halls acted as organizing mechanisms in the early Congresses. Members who lived with administration loyalists were more likely to be loyal and vice versa. Third, political ideology mattered. Moderate members were more likely than party stalwarts to vote with the opposition.

This article employs modern social science tools to address the political parties’ motivations during the Louisiana Purchase. First, I provide a brief history of the Jay Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, and the status of the early political parties. Second, I analyze the decisions the political parties made during the Louisiana Purchase period. Third, I discuss the factors beyond partisan affiliation that influenced members’ votes and the electoral consequences of their votes. Fourth, I conclude by arguing that an institutional perspective on the Louisiana Purchase can provide additional insight into early party politics.

The Jay Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Early Political Parties

The Jay Treaty

The Jay Treaty, signed by the United States in 1794 and ratified by the Senate a year later, presents a good starting point for a discussion of the Louisiana Purchase because several political issues raised during the Jay Treaty debates resurfaced during the Louisiana Purchase debates (see Bemis 1962 and Combs 1970 for excellent treatments of the Jay Treaty). First, the Jay Treaty, perhaps more than any other event during Washington’s presidency, divided the political elite into two—what would become distinct—parties. The Jay Treaty divided the predominant political ideologies of the day, as advocates formed the Federalist Party, which generally approved of a strong national government headed by a strong chief executive, and skeptics formed the Republican Party, which viewed unilateral executive actions skeptically and strident national government programs suspiciously. Washington’s actions were perfectly consistent with the Federalists’ conception of presidential power and inconsistent with the Republicans’ more reserved ideal. Second, Jay Treaty skeptics opposed John Jay’s appointment as a special envoy to Great Britain to resolve the conflicts lingering from the American Revolutionary War. They thought that existing diplomatic channels were sufficient (Combs 1970: 127). Third, Jay Treaty opponents bitterly com-
plained about what they deemed secret negotiations. At one point, the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding the release of all Washington administration papers regarding Jay’s negotiations. Fourth, most historians think that Madison, Jefferson, and their followers, in opposing the Jay Treaty, “were acting on their principles of foreign policy in these debates” (ibid.: 186). Finally, when congressional approval of the Jay Treaty was in doubt, the Washington administration attempted to link it with the popularly received Pinckney Treaty. Thomas Pinckney successfully negotiated with Spain for U.S. rights to navigate entirely the Mississippi River and to deposit freely goods in New Orleans for transfer to ships bound for Europe and the East Coast. Both concessions, though only granted for three years, were wildly popular throughout the United States, especially in the West.

Following the expiration of the Pinckney Treaty, Spain continued to permit American navigation along the Mississippi River as well as the American transfer of goods in New Orleans. Trade within the United States and between the United States and Europe grew and prospered. Then rather abruptly, on October 18, 1802, the Spanish government’s representative in Louisiana revoked the right of deposit, thereby infuriating western traders and the entire American population. Americans speculated that Spain was severing its ties to the United States at the behest of Napoléon.

Americans much preferred Louisiana in the weaker and more benign Spanish hands. Nonetheless, France had retaken the deed for Louisiana, though neither France nor Spain would confirm the transfer. Napoléon dreamed of establishing an empire in the West. By first controlling Haiti as his gateway to the New World and then reacquiring Louisiana from Spain (to which France had ceded the territory in 1762), Napoléon’s dream could become reality. Napoléon sent troops to Haiti and Louisiana to fortify his burgeoning empire. Yellow fever and militant locals soon depleted 90 percent of the French troops in Haiti, though, so Napoléon transferred to Haiti most of the troops headed to Louisiana, leaving only a skeleton force on the mainland.

The Louisiana Purchase

When the Jefferson administration realized that Napoléon’s waxing western empire dreams were forestalled, it began coaxing France into selling New Orleans. The purchase of just New Orleans would be no small feat. By 1810
it had become the fifth most populous city in the United States, behind only New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston (Dodd 1993). To facilitate the purchase, Jefferson sent James Monroe as a special envoy to Paris to negotiate a peaceful transfer of the port city. The day before Monroe arrived, Napoléon sent out feelers to Robert Livingston, the U.S. ambassador to France, for the purchase of the entire Louisiana Territory. Within 15 days the American and French negotiators signed the treaty and conventions transferring 828,000 square miles to the United States. As he affixed his signature on the documents, Livingston claimed, “Today, the United States take their place among the powers of the first rank” (quoted in Scroggs 1943: 161). On October 20, 1803, the Senate ratified the treaty, and by November 3 the House and Senate approved the appropriations for the purchase. “Next in historical importance to the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution,” John Quincy Adams retorted, the Louisiana Purchase “was unparalleled in diplomacy because it cost almost nothing” (quoted in Cerami 2003: 205).

The Early Political Parties

Under the Constitution, it was questionable if parties would even form. Not only were they not mentioned in the Constitution, but also Madison, in Federalist No. 10, stated that the many sources of power created by the Constitution would retard their development. Nonetheless, as John H. Aldrich (1995) argues, the interplay of principles, interests, and institutions drove the creation of the two parties. They were primarily an outgrowth of individual legislators’ responses to “the Great Principle,” which Aldrich (ibid.: 70) describes as “just how strong and active the new federal government was to be.” The Jay Treaty forced the political elite to answer implicitly this fundamental question.

John F. Hoadley (1980) argues that political parties go through four stages of development: factionalism, polarization, expansion into the public, and institutionalization. If the parties were factionalizing through the first three Congresses, they began polarizing in the Fourth Congress (1795–96). Figure 1 shows the ideological separation of the two parties during the first 10 Congresses. The line in the middle of the dark gray and light gray regions is the average Federalist and Republican ideology score as measured by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-NOMINATE, which is calcu-
Figure 1  The ideological divergence between the Federalists and the Republicans, First through Tenth Congresses

lated through a complex program that takes account of all votes with more than minor opposition in both chambers for every Congress. The region on either side is one standard deviation above and below the mean. Although the respective parties’ averages did not change much over the first 10 Congresses, both parties became much more homogeneous, as indicated by the shrinking shaded region on either side of the parties’ means.

Hoadley (1980) suggests that the debate in the Fourth Congress over the Jay Treaty crystallized the distinction between the two groups of legislators who were previously at odds over “the Great Principle.” In fact, if we compare the first four Congresses (up to and including the Jay Treaty Congress) to the Fifth through Tenth Congresses, we see that both divergence between the parties and consistency within the parties grew.

Hoadley’s theory of party development suggests that, having gone through factionalism and polarization, the parties would begin to cast a more explicit eye toward electoral considerations and mass mobilization of the public. But because of the quick demise of the Federalists, it is unclear if the first party system ever reached this third phase. Although Federalists won the first three presidential elections, their grasp on American politics weakened considerably in 1800, as shown in figure 2. Not only was Jefferson, a
Republican, elected president in 1800, but the Federalists became a minority party in both the Senate and the House for the first time since the adoption of the Constitution. In fact, the Republicans held more than 60 percent of the seats in the Seventh Congress (1801–3). The 1802 midterm elections solidified their grip as the majority party.

The situation for the Federalist Party was worse than even the 1800 and
1802 election results suggest. As the United States grew westward, the relative importance of New England—the Federalist stronghold—declined. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Congress admitted seven new western states, increasing membership in the Senate by 14 seats and the House by 106 seats. Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the states to the west held only 3.7 percent of the House and 17.6 percent of the Senate in 1800; by 1825 they held 22.6 percent of the House and 37.5 percent of the Senate. In contrast, New Englanders held 36.4 percent of the House and 41.1 percent of the Senate in 1800; by 1825 they held 32.3 percent of the House and 33.3 percent of the Senate.

With the revolution of 1800, Jefferson and the Republicans rolled back many existing Federalist policies. As Aldrich (1995: 80) explains: “Although a disorganized majority could be split and thereby defeated, a more organized majority could be divided less often. There is an alternative in a republic, however, and that is to seek to capture a majority in Congress by popular election.” The prospects for a Federalist electoral wave diminished, however, as the population of the United States shifted away from New England.

The burgeoning western population hurt the Federalists not only because it reduced the relative importance of New England but also because the Federalists had never done well in the West. In fact, no Federalist had ever been—or ever would be—elected from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or the states to the west. Voters in the frontier typically adopted the Republican partisanship of their ancestors from the middle Atlantic and southern states. Additionally, their partisanship was reinforced by their preference for personal liberty over government-established order (Cayton 1986); their distrust of Jay, who sold out their interests to northeastern shippers in a failed 1786 treaty with Spain; and their requited love with Jefferson, who had always cast a dreamy eye toward the West (Cerami 2003).

Either as a cause or as a result of the westerners’ ideology, the Federalists viewed the West, at best, as irrelevant and, at worst, with antagonism. Washington and Alexander Hamilton sought to control the West with federal institutions and directives from the national government; Republicans, on the other hand, pushed for a more egalitarian agrarian democracy. The Federalists’ anti-West views did not end with philosophical disagreements. In the 1790s, when they still had complete control of the federal government, the Federalists doubled the price of land in the West and failed to pursue rigorously free passage on the Mississippi River and the right of...
deposit in New Orleans. Although Pinckney, a Federalist, eventually negotiated the treaty to open up the Mississippi River and New Orleans for western trade, James E. Lewis Jr. (1998: 22–23) maintains that “it bore the stamp of Republican more than Federalist thinking.” The Federalists’ policy toward the Indians was continuously criticized throughout the West. Additionally, the Federalists initially opposed appropriating money to explore the West and opposed admitting Tennessee into the Union (Cayton 1992; Ambrose 1996; Lewis 1998). Although the Washington administration also backed a few pro-western policies, such as the treaties of San Lorenzo and Greenville, westerners’ hearts lay with Jefferson and the Republicans, and their heads quickly followed.

As the country moved south and west, the Federalists’ long-standing philosophical and political differences with voters in the West severely damaged their national prospects. The Federalist Party would be a permanent minority if the South and West continued to unite in national elections. When Spain withdrew the right of Americans to transfer goods in New Orleans in 1802, however, the Federalists were presented with a political opportunity to start anew with the burgeoning West. “Every eye in the U.S. is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana,” Jefferson (1905: 368) declared in an April 18, 1802, letter to Livingston, “perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has produced more uneasy sensations through the body of the nation.” While the Jefferson administration attempted to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the right-of-deposit issue, tempers in the West flared: “Mass meetings were held at Pittsburgh, Lexington, and other places and throughout the whole western country the public mind was thrown into a flame ready to burst forth in war” (Lewis 1903: 124). Amid this uproar, the Federalists, ignoring their past indifference and disgust toward the West, offered a strident defense of the westerners’ use of the Mississippi River and New Orleans. Hamilton (1803) led the Federalists’ charge:

[Spain’s withdrawal of the right of deposit] threatens the early dismemberment of a large portion of our country. . . . A manifest and great danger to the nation: the nature of cession to France, extending to ancient limits without respect to our rights by treaty; the direct infraction of an important article of the treaty itself in withholding the deposit of New-Orleans; either of these affords [a] justifiable case [for] WAR. . . . [That either] would authorize immediate hostilities is not to be questioned by the most scrupulous mind.
Hamilton went on to ridicule the Jefferson administration for not being sufficiently protective of settlers in the West and American interests abroad. Hamilton’s fellow Federalists in Congress introduced legislation that provided for both money and men to protect the westerners’ claims to free transportation along the Mississippi and free deposit of goods in New Orleans (see *Annals of the Congress* 1802–3, 12: 83–89, 91–97, 105, 171, 208, 254, for debate on Senator James Ross’s resolution).

The western settlers must have been as shocked as the Republicans to learn of the Federalists’ strong defense of the West. The Federalists’ reversal of position on the West was the first of several flip-flops in both parties’ positions. If the Federalists’ biggest switch was over unquestioned support of western interests, the Republicans’ biggest switch was the president’s unilateral purchase of Louisiana, an action that Jefferson, at least initially, thought was constitutionally dubious and certainly counter to the limited executive power he had advocated during the Washington and Adams administrations. “Jefferson premised his foreign policy goals on principle,” according to Joyce Appleby (2005: 99), “but in clearing a path for American expansion he willingly took a detour through the duplicities of diplomacy.” That the parties could achieve such complete switches in their positions so quickly is surprising; that they could do so without the modern uses of favorable committee assignments and party dollars in elections is remarkable.

**Understanding the Political Parties’ Actions**

If historians mention the catalog of partisan flip-flops at all—and they usually do not—they give it a role secondary to the powerful personalities involved in the Louisiana Purchase. Although they describe the actions of the political leaders, they tend to ignore the inconsistency with their earlier issue positions. These systematic flip-flops provide social scientists with an opportunity to scrutinize the motives and strategies of the early political parties.

**The Hypotheses**

Three hypotheses are offered to explain the parties’ flip-flops on major issue positions. First, taking Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton at their word, these changes might be nothing more than the normal development of party positions. Perhaps the situations surrounding the Jay Treaty in the late eighteenth
century and the Louisiana Purchase in the early nineteenth century are sufficiently different to make a comparison of issue positions inappropriate.

Federalists could explain their strident view in protecting the West as an outgrowth of their strong defense policies. After all, a major source of disagreement between the parties during the Washington administration was whether the United States should have a standing navy. Once the Federalists propagated their militaristic views, the Republicans were forced into a corner that eventually resulted in the issue flip-flops. While this hypothesis might explain the position flip-flops related to the West, it cannot explain those involving the president’s power to act unilaterally.

Second, perhaps the change from Presidents Washington and John Adams, both Federalists, to President Jefferson, a Republican, caused the parties to view the same situation differently. When Republicans controlled the levers of national government, the threat of strong central authority was not as great for believers in small government as it was when the Federalists were in charge. Likewise the Federalists may have become more suspicious of strong presidential leadership when the president was in the opposition party. Under this hypothesis, loyalty to particular politicians trumped loyalty to party principles. Like the first hypothesis, the switch in presidents can explain some of the issue flip-flops. It makes sense that the Republicans in Congress were more comfortable with strident presidential actions when Jefferson was in power, whereas the Federalists were more likely to seek checks on the presidential prerogatives in that circumstance. But the change in the presidents’ parties cannot account for the parties’ policy changes on the West.

Third, it may be argued that the changing political environment forced the parties to sacrifice issue purity and position consistency for political expediency. This hypothesis counters the existing political science literature. Aldrich (1995: 94) summarizes the conventional wisdom: the early parties “fell far short of the true modern political party.” He maintains that they were fully functioning “parties-in-government” but that they “were not much in the way of electoral parties.” Aldrich is certainly correct inasmuch as the parties were not organized into electoral coalitions with the spoils to be decided by the election. But this conventional wisdom may understate party development if it suggests that electoral forces did not influence the government’s decisions.

The election of 1800 was the first in which an incumbent party (the Fed-
eralists) lost. With another presidential election just around the corner, the Federalists might have realized that their existing policy on the West was certain to win few votes and that a defense of strong presidential action would only benefit Jefferson. Unless the Federalists quickly changed these policies, Jefferson was sure to win a second term. Likewise, the Republicans might have abandoned their skepticism of strong presidential leadership when they realized that Jefferson could use it to ensure electoral victory.

Certainly, the parties had taken actions with an eye toward public approval in the past. The Jay Treaty mobilized the opposition parties into two camps and initiated an active role for the people in the political process. Both parties had organized demonstrations and petition drives surrounding their positions on the Jay Treaty. Ultimately, the Federalists relied upon the political power and personal appeal of Washington to seal the treaty through confirmation and implementation (Combs 1970; Ellis 2005). The issue positions underlying their public campaigns, however, were consistent with the parties’ previously articulated principles. This is not so with popular appeals during the Louisiana Purchase. The parties’ newfound positions regarding the purchase contravened previously articulated principles.

The Decision Tree

To test more rigorously the electoral hypothesis, I developed a decision tree, presented in figure 3. The tree shows the Federalists’ and the Republicans’ decisions on how they could react to the withdrawal of the American right of deposit in New Orleans. This tree is not a thorough representation of the actions that ultimately led to the American acquisition of Louisiana; rather, it is a simplified analytic tool to understand why the Federalists would have decided to defend strongly the West’s interests. The tree contains four decision makers: Napoléon (N), Thomas Jefferson (TJ), the Federalists (F), and the western settlers (WS).

First, as denoted on the far left, Napoléon could either militarily enforce Spanish policy limiting the American right of deposit in New Orleans (aggressive) or not (passive). Second, Jefferson could either respond to Napoléon’s decision with military retaliation (bellicose) or not (compliant). Third, depending on Jefferson’s actions, the Federalists in Congress could either challenge Jefferson’s policy (oppose) or endorse it (support). Unencumbered with the responsibility of policy making, they, in contrast to Jefferson, could
Figure 3  Understanding minority party opposition in the Louisiana Purchase
act strategically without great policy consequences. After all, foreign governments in France, Spain, and England would ultimately respond to the president’s policy, not to the policies articulated by Federalists. Finally, at the last node, based on which party most clearly supported their Mississippi River claims, the *western settlers* could support either the Republicans or the Federalists in the ensuing elections.

But for one twist, the decision tree would be pedestrian. If Napoléon is aggressive and Jefferson retaliates, as depicted by Jefferson’s top branch, then war occurs—the worst possible outcome for everyone. Under such a scenario, the decisions by the Federalists and the western settlers do not matter because the solution is determined by the outcome of the war, which occurs in a later time period. Suffice it to say that Jefferson would hope to avoid war. The outcome for Jefferson’s second and fourth branches, when he is compliant, is a continuation of the Spanish restriction on American trade in New Orleans. On his third branch, Jefferson threatens militaristic action, causing Napoléon, who is passive, to rescind the Spanish policy.

The Federalists face a decision at three nodes, on Jefferson’s second, third, and fourth branches. First, if France is aggressive and Jefferson is compliant, the Federalists can either support or oppose him. If they support him, the western settlers fall back on their defaulted Republican partisanship because they cannot distinguish between the policies advocated by the administration and the Federalists. If, however, the Federalists oppose the administration, they can appeal to the western settlers by stridently supporting them while Jefferson is dawdling. Second, if Napoléon is passive and Jefferson retaliates, the western settlers’ rights are sustained, and they support the Republicans irrespective of the Federalists’ decision. Third, if Napoléon is passive and Jefferson is compliant, the Federalists can again either support or oppose the administration. If they support Jefferson, the western settlers, because they cannot distinguish the parties’ positions, again support the Republicans. If, however, the Federalists oppose Jefferson, they can appeal to the western settlers and secure their support in the ensuing elections.

**The Outcome**

By solving the decision tree through backward induction, the Federalists can only win back a governing majority if Jefferson is compliant and they oppose his policy. Under this scenario, the settlers vote for the Federalist Party in
future elections. If the Federalists can win only when Jefferson is passive, why does Jefferson not always choose military retaliation? The complication for Jefferson is that if he retaliates when Napoléon is aggressive, war results. So some of the time Jefferson wins, if he retaliates and Napoléon is passive, and the western settlers will be confirmed in their Republican tendencies; and some of the time he loses, if he is bellicose and Napoléon is aggressive.

The decision tree shows that the Federalists should always defend the westerners' claims. In those instances where Jefferson dawdles, they can become a governing majority by combining their support in the Northeast with their newfound support in the West, a strategy incidentally used successfully by the Whigs some 30 years later. This lesson was not lost on the Federalists. Henry Adams (1986 [1889–91]: 284) makes the case:

The New England Federalists were satisfied that President Jefferson must either adopt their own policy and make war on France, or risk a dissolution of the Union. They had hardly dared hope that democracy would so soon meet what might prove to be its crisis. They too cried for war, and cared little whether their outcry produced or prevented hostilities, for the horns of Jefferson's dilemma were equally fatal to him. All eyes were bent on the President, and watched eagerly for some sign of his intention.

While the Federalists could act out of electoral considerations, Jefferson had to be much more prudent because he had the responsibility of governing. Due to the Republican majority in Congress, Jefferson could more easily control the proceedings in Washington, DC, but in states beyond the Appalachian Mountains, state legislatures were increasing the heat: “One state legislature after another adopted resolutions which shook the ground under his feet” (ibid.: 290). These resolutions were much more in line with the Federalists’ vehement sentiments than they were with the Republicans’ cautious approach.

Unfortunately for the Federalists, Jefferson used the dual reaction of the Federalists and the western legislatures to get his way. By showing the Spanish and French leaders the Federalists’ and westerners’ vitriolic rhetoric, Jefferson impressed upon them the difficulty they would have in keeping the peace in New Orleans. France and Spain, both gearing up for a European war, were reluctant to devote energy and resources to enforcing not only the New Orleans restriction but also their claim on the land. Thus they relented and removed the restriction on the right to deposit. According to Alexander
DeConde (1976: 117), “The bellicosity of extreme Federalists [made] Jeffersonian aggressiveness appear more moderate than it was.” Jefferson skillfully used the Federalists’ rhetoric to scare Spain, which ultimately relented on the deposit issue rather than face war over a territory it was soon to relinquish. Perhaps more damaging for the Federalists was the fact that Monroe and Livingston used the rhetoric to entice Napoléon to sell the land rather than try to overrun the hotheaded westerners in setting up his western empire.

The decision tree thus sheds light on why the Federalists seemingly reversed course and defended western interests in Louisiana after treating them as irrelevant for almost 20 years. Only by aggressively defending the western settlers could the Federalists broaden their appeal and remain politically relevant. Additionally, the tree demonstrates how Jefferson used the Federalists’ strategy to defeat them by encouraging the European powers to take a passive approach to Louisiana. In the end Napoléon (really Spain) was passive and Jefferson bellicose—though not as aggressive as either the Federalists or the westerners. As a result the episode confirmed westerners’ Republican partisanship.

Within months of the playing out of the decision tree, the Federalist Party suffered its knockout blow—the American purchase of Louisiana. Adams (1986 [1889–91]: 358) notes, “The next issue of the [Boston] ‘Chronicle,’ June 30, contained a single headline, which sounded the deathknell of Federalism altogether: ‘Louisiana ceded to the United States!’” He explains their dilemma: “The great news had arrived; and the Federalist orators of July 4, 1803, set about their annual task of foreboding the ruin of society amid the cheers and congratulations of the happiest society the world then knew” (ibid.). As Jefferson wrote to Meriwether Lewis on January 13, 1804:

> The acquisition of the country through which you are to pass has inspired the public generally with a great deal of interest in your enterprise. . . . The Federalists, alone still treat it as philosophism, and would rejoice in its failure. Their bitterness increases with the diminution of their number and despair of a resurrection. I hope you will take care of yourself, and be the living witness of their malice and folly. (Jackson 1978)

Indeed, the Federalists’ untenable position on the purchase left them reeling. The 1804 elections were the most devastating to the Federalists yet. Of
the 14 seats that switched parties, the Federalists lost all but 1. Even in the “revolution of 1800,” the Republicans won a lower percentage of the seats that switched parties.

The decision tree shows that the parties’ actions during the Louisiana Purchase debates may have been rationally based on electoral considerations. If that claim is true, sufficient evidence exists to show that the earliest parties not only factionalized and mobilized but also became electoral coalitions—the third step of Hoadley’s party development program. The degree to which the parties took this third step can be tested with empirical evidence. Granted, categorizing members into parties during the early Congresses is difficult for two reasons. First, the parties were immature within both the electorate and the legislature. Second, regional disparities and variations obfuscate neat categories. Scholars typically rely on two methods for determining early members’ partisan affiliations, using either their party allegiance during their last election or the roll call votes they cast for chamber leadership positions and floor procedures.

These categorizing schemes do not line up as much as we, in the twenty-first century, would think; with rare exception today, Democratic candidates who win vote for the Democratic Speaker candidate and Republicans for the Republican. But as the parties were forming 200 years ago, this was not always the case. In fact, in the first four Congresses up to and including the Jay Treaty Congress, only 52.5 percent of the House members are categorized in the same group under both schemes. In the three Congresses between the Jay Treaty and the Louisiana Purchase, this number jumps to 61.3 percent. During the Louisiana Purchase Congress and the two that followed it (the Eighth through the Tenth Congresses), 63.1 percent are classified consistently. The trend of the percentages for the Senate in those Congresses is similar: 60.1, 67.6, and 80.3, respectively. These data show that the connection between elections and legislative actions became more explicit as a result of first the Jay Treaty and then the Louisiana Purchase.

Influences on Louisiana Purchase

Roll Call Votes

The factionalism and polarization that started with debates on “the Great Principle” and continued through the Jay Treaty persisted in debates surrounding the Louisiana Purchase. The political parties were the organizing
units behind the Louisiana Purchase debate. Every vote save one taken on the Louisiana Purchase in the House of Representatives and the Senate during the Eighth Congress separated along party lines. Whether members were deciding to approve the appropriation, to agree to Senate amendments, or to approve final passage, a majority of Republicans always opposed a majority of Federalists in the House and did so three out of four times in the Senate (see table 1). Moreover the minority party’s votes were meaningless because the Republicans remained sufficiently unified to pass or defeat every legislative action with their votes alone.

The House Republicans voted unanimously on two of the four votes (table 1, votes 3 and 4). Across all four House votes, 91.8 percent of Republicans and 80.9 percent of Federalists voted with their party. The parties were not only internally cohesive but also externally divided. The difference in support between the two parties averaged 72.6 percent (i.e., on average, 86.3 percent of Republicans voted with 13.7 percent of Federalists). In fact the \( p \)-values for the difference in proportion tests show that Republicans voted differently from Federalists in statistically significant numbers on all four votes. The modus operandi for the parties was to split from one another, but on occasion members did defect. The following sections analyze the two votes in the House in which there was more than a 30.0 percent defection by one party (table 1, votes 1 and 4) and then the Senate votes.

Forcing Jefferson to Release Executive Branch Documents

On October 24, 1803, members of the House of Representatives considered whether Congress should force President Jefferson to release all the documents in his possession relating to France’s retrocession of Louisiana. The Federalists questioned whether Spain had truly relinquished its claim to Louisiana. Representative Roger Griswold, a Federalist, worried that France, cash-strapped with an impending European war, might be attempting to soak the United States for land it did not rightly possess. Adams (1986 [1889–91]: 339) laid out the potential problems with the U.S. purchase of Louisiana from France: “The sale of Louisiana to the United States was trebly invalid: if it were French property, Bonaparte could not constitutionally alienate it without the consent of the Chambers; if it were Spanish property, he could not alienate it at all; if Spain had a right of reclamation, his sale was worth-
Table 1  Roll call votes involving the Louisiana Purchase, Eighth Congress (1803–4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote number</th>
<th>Vote description</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Republican percentage in favor</th>
<th>Federalist percentage in favor</th>
<th>Absolute difference</th>
<th>$p$-value $^a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To adopt the Griswold Amendment</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To pass the House resolution making provisions to implement the Louisiana Purchase</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To pass the Senate bill authorizing the president to take possession of Louisiana</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To pass the bill to carry into effect the Louisiana Purchase</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To ratify the Louisiana Purchase Treaty</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To pass a bill making the laws of the United States operate in the territory</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To pass the House bill authorizing the sale of stock to finance the Louisiana Purchase</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To pass a resolution clarifying the role of the president in implementing the Louisiana Purchase</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ $p$-values come from the difference in proportion tests between Republicans and Federalists.
less.” Griswold’s opponents, nonetheless, mercilessly called his amendment “premature” and “improper and indecorous” (Annals of the Congress 1803–4, 13: 394, 413). They alleged that its only purpose was to “procrastinate and embarrass” Jefferson (ibid.: 402).

The measure ultimately failed, 57 to 59 (ibid.: 414). Of the 30 Federalists, 29 supported Griswold, and he received almost as many votes from the Republicans; 28 of the 86 Republicans voted for the release of the executive branch documents. Only 1 of the 28 defecting Republicans spoke during the debate on the floor, and he rose shortly after Griswold introduced the amendment to signal his opposition to the amendment. Of the 28 defecting Republicans, 11 had voted against a similar resolution in the previous Congress.

Why did nearly one-third of the Republicans abandon their party to support a motion that did little except “embarrass” their president? Perhaps because of the large appropriation, Republican leaders wanted to protect particular members should the Federalists be right in warning of a boondoggle. But this defection on such a key vote is puzzling considering that “the infallibility of Jefferson in the political field was like unto that of the pope in the spiritual, a denial of his inspiration was heresy, punishable by political death” (Harlow 1917: 192).

I offer four explanations for the Republican defections. First, Republicans who were ideologically close to the Federalists might have voted with them on this particular vote. For the early Congresses, the DW-NOMINATE ideology scores track the role of the federal government, with high scores corresponding to proponents of a strong central government (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). On this vote, some higher-scoring Republicans might have voted with the high-scoring Federalists. The second explanation concerns legislators’ experience. The longer representatives serve in Congress, the more likely they are to support congressional prerogatives. Newly elected members may have felt that they owed their elections in part to Jefferson’s popularity and would have been more likely to lay down their institutional interests for their political interests. The third explanation is a measure of Jefferson’s popularity within the representatives’ states. Members of Congress from states in which Jefferson received more support might have been less likely to defect. Presumably, pro-Jefferson states expected to be represented by pro-Jefferson members of Congress. Because the popular votes of the 1800
presidential election are unknown, the operationalization of this variable is the percentage of presidential electors from the 1800 election who voted for Jefferson.

The last explanation, federal boardinghouses, is perhaps the most interesting and the most difficult to test. Although his thesis has come under attack (Bogue and Marlaire 1975), Young (1966) provides a unique explanation for early congressional voting. Young hypothesizes that, in an age when parties were still forming and members traveled long distances that required great expense and energy, voting coalitions in Congress corresponded to the large group boardinghouses where members lived during the congressional session. Young (ibid.: 102) explains: “The official record of roll call votes . . . offers evidence which persuasively argues that the after-dinner ‘parlor assemblies’ in the congressional boardinghouses were ‘caucuses’ in fact if they were not so in name, and which explains why legislators occasionally applied the term ‘party’ to their boardinghouse fraternity.” It remains unclear if legislators who lived together voted alike because they lived together or if they lived together because they voted alike.

Perry M. Goldman and Young (1973) provide a thorough list of boardinghouse guests for a smattering of congressional sessions through 1840. Although they do not provide a breakdown for the Eighth Congress, I examined their data for the second session of the Seventh Congress to see if the boardinghouse effect might be sustained over the six months of the summer adjournment. Simple bivariate analysis suggests that the boardinghouses did have some effect. While Republicans were only 68.2 percent cohesive overall, Republicans who boarded with other Republicans were 82.2 percent cohesive.

To test the effects of these four possible explanations using multivariate regression, I code the dependent variable as 1 if the Republican voted against Jefferson and 0 if he voted with Jefferson. The overall fit of the model is adequate. The model correctly predicts almost three-quarters of the observations (see table 2, column A).

The only two variables that yield statistically significant results are ideology and boardinghouse. To assess the substantive significance of these variables, the coefficients need to be transformed into meaningful probabilities. The average Republican member has a .280 probability of voting against Jefferson. When ideology is evaluated at the highest and lowest value, this probability changes 55.4 percentage points. The variable with the largest
impact on the Republicans’ probability of defection is their place of residence during the Seventh Congress. If the average Republican lived in an anti-Jefferson boardinghouse, his probability of opposing Jefferson by calling for the disclosure of the executive branch documents is .771. In contrast, if he roomed in a pro-Jefferson boardinghouse, the probability drops to .093 (for a spread of 67.8 percentage points). At least for this one vote during the Eighth Congress, the boardinghouses exerted a substantively and statistically significant effect, above and beyond the legislators’ ideology.

The Final Passage Vote on the Louisiana Purchase

Upon Senate ratification of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty, Congress next considered a bill to approve the appropriation to implement the treaty. Congressman Griswold again led the Federalists in criticizing the treaty and its expansiveness, though their argument was a bit precarious. On the one hand,
he explained, “so fully was I impressed . . . with the importance of [the right of deposit], that I was persuaded very vigorous measures ought to have been adopted for vindicating and securing rights which had been grossly violated,” but on the other hand, “I can never consent to secure this object, however desirable and important, by means which shall set at defiance the Constitution of my country” (Annals of the Congress 1803–4, 13: 460). Thomas Randolph criticized Griswold’s argument, offering a line-by-line defense of the treaty and conventions.

After the extensive debate among Griswold and Randolph and their respective allies, the House adopted the resolution making the appropriation for the Louisiana Purchase. The vote was 90 to 25, with all 85 Republicans supporting it and 25 of 30 Federalists opposing it. Due to the partisan nature of the vote, I can again only analyze the votes within one party (the Federalists). Unlike the vote for the Griswold Amendment, however, multivariate analysis is more difficult and less certain because there are far fewer observations.

The analysis in table 2, columns B and C, includes the same explanatory variables as column A, but the dependent variable is now coded 1 if a Federalist voted in favor of the Louisiana Purchase appropriation (20.0 percent) and 0 if the Federalist voted against it (80.0 percent). The pseudo-$R^2$ is 0.500, and the model correctly predicts 86.7 percent of the observations. Although the model fits the data well, the large standard errors and the lack of strong statistical significance suggest that several of the independent variables are multicollinear. Accordingly, column B presents the bivariate relationship, and column C presents the multivariate relationship between the independent variables and the Federalists’ vote on final passage.

The ideology measure again correlates strongly with the vote, as indicated by its statistical significance in both the bivariate and the multivariate analysis. The negative coefficient indicates that the biggest supporters of a proactive central government were most likely to oppose the purchase. Indeed, the partisan dynamics of this Congress—especially over this issue—had the proponents of an active government accusing Jefferson of being too active and the proponents of the agrarian democracy defending him. The boardinghouse variable is again a powerful predictor of the vote. By transforming the coefficients into probabilities, the boardinghouse Federalists were 92.3 percent cohesive, whereas the non-boardinghouse Federalists were 66.7 percent cohesive (the difference between these percentages is sta-
tistically significant \( p < .05 \)). Due to the structure of the data, however, this variable cannot be used in the multivariate analysis.

Louisiana Purchase Votes in the Senate

The data from the Senate votes are almost as divided along party lines as those from the House votes (see table 1). Although the difference in the Senate is 54.0 versus 72.6 in the House, the parties were still fairly divided. On average, 73.0 percent of the Republicans voted with 27.0 percent of the Federalists. Of the four votes on the Louisiana Purchase, the Republicans were completely unanimous on three votes but split 6 to 16 on the last vote. The Federalists, on the other hand, had greater than 30.0 percent defection on three of the four votes. Given that no more than nine Federalists voted on any one of these votes, however, it is nearly impossible to perform any rigorous quantitative analysis. The lone defection on the first vote, Jonathan Dayton, also defected on the other three. He had the lowest DW-NOMINATE score (0.45) of all the Senate Federalists. Senators William Wells and Samuel White defected on two of the four votes. Their DW-NOMINATE scores (0.66 and 0.58, respectively) were also near or below the average for all Federalists senators (0.65). No other systematic pattern is detectable in the data.

Completing the Electoral Connection?

Henry Adams claims that the Louisiana Purchase began the death knell for the Federalist Party. Although his argument rests more upon the expansion of Republican land, we can test whether the party leaders’ more electorally explicit decisions had an impact on the ensuing elections. The analysis is complicated, of course, because actual election results for 1804 are largely incomplete.

Thus, instead of analyzing actual election results, I assess whether members’ votes from table 2 had an impact on their congressional careers. None of the 23 Republicans who voted in favor of the Griswold Amendment lost in 1804, as opposed to 2 out of 53 Republicans who voted against it. The difference between the two is almost statistically significant \( .10 > p > .05 \). Likewise, no Federalists who voted for the Louisiana Purchase lost in 1804, as opposed to two Federalists who supported the purchase. Again, the difference is almost statistically significant \( .10 > p > .05 \). The difference between
the Republicans and Federalists who broke party ranks and those who voted the party position suggests that the loyal party members fared worse in future elections. Such a conclusion is hasty, however, because the members who lost may have come from competitive states, thus contravening the relationship between members’ votes and the future elections.

Multivariate analysis on future winners versus future losers cannot be performed because of the perfect predictive power described above for the members who voted against the majority of their party (they all won). But multivariate analysis can be used to examine whether the member served in the next Congress. All members who retired, resigned, died, or lost are coded as 0, and those who continued to serve are coded as 1. The independent variables for the Republicans are their votes on the Griswold Amendment (for the Federalists, final passage of the Louisiana Purchase), their states’ proportion of presidential electors for Jefferson in 1804, their ideology, and their years of service. As table 3 shows, only their states’ support for Jefferson nears conventional levels of statistical significance. The observed relationship between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Griswold Amendment</td>
<td>Final passage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Republicans only)</td>
<td>(Federalists only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes on Griswold Amendment</td>
<td>0.048 (0.780)</td>
<td>−0.388 (1.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes on final passage</td>
<td></td>
<td>−4.071 (3.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (strong central government)</td>
<td>1.598 (2.730)</td>
<td>−0.017 (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147 (0.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in the House</td>
<td>−0.017 (0.120)</td>
<td>0.147 (0.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State support for Jefferson</td>
<td>3.927* (2.860)</td>
<td>−3.965* (3.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.930)</td>
<td>(3.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.570 (2.930)</td>
<td>6.093* (3.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.930)</td>
<td>(3.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−31.066</td>
<td>−16.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage correctly predicted</td>
<td>88.240</td>
<td>70.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Dependent variable coded 1 if the member continued serving in the Ninth Congress, otherwise 0. *p < .1.
members’ votes and their continued congressional careers, once other variables are included in the analysis, almost completely falls away.

Performing rigorous analysis on the Federalist senators is exceedingly difficult because of the staggered elections, indirect elections, and incomplete election records. Suffice it to say that the Federalist Party took a hit throughout the nation—a hit that did not distinguish between Federalists who supported the Louisiana Purchase and Federalists who did not support it.

The intense partisanship over the Louisiana Purchase was consistent with the popular convention of congressional decision making, especially after the Jay Treaty debates. While party was the dominant factor, it was not the only one. Member ideology, institutional loyalty, constituent considerations, and boardinghouse membership were other influences upon member voting in the Louisiana Purchase debate. Even though the parties may have been making more electorally explicit decisions, the connection between individual voting on the Louisiana Purchase and future electoral viability was nonexistent. Voters, at least in the early 1800s, seem to have held parties, but not necessarily individual members of Congress, accountable for their positions (Theriault 2005).

Conclusion

U.S. political parties’ positions were in great flux in the early 1800s. Jefferson and his fellow Republicans, previously loyal to France, talked of marrying U.S. interests to those of England. By philosophical origin and in their opposition to both the Washington and the Adams administrations, they read the U.S. Constitution narrowly; when Louisiana came up for sale, however, Republicans interpreted constitutional language more loosely. Federalists also flip-flopped. Initially viewing the western frontier with disdain, they eventually became its biggest defenders in the Capitol only to oppose its sale to the United States later in the same Congress. During the Washington administration, they called the antiadministration representatives unpatriotic when they pressed Washington to release executive branch documents pertaining to the Jay Treaty. Nine years later the Federalists called for executive branch documents pertaining to the French retrocession of Louisiana from Spain. Indeed, according to historian William M. Sloane (1904: 518), “it entailed . . . a complete reversal of all the political and party principles of the platform on which they had hitherto stood.”
Although the ideology and individual positions of the parties vacillated, their cohesion remained strong. In analyzing the domestic politics of the Louisiana Purchase, no other independent variable so accurately predicts a member’s roll call vote as his partisan affiliation—not ideology, not boardinghouse, not experience, and not region. In addition to party, members’ stands on issues depended upon where they sat and slept. Although they were willing to support their president, if they defected from their party, they were likely to do so to defend the prerogatives of Congress. Additionally, if they lived with Jefferson supporters, they were more likely to support him, and if they lived with Jefferson opponents, they were more likely to oppose him. While party mattered most, institutional loyalty, ideology, and members’ living situations were more than a passing fancy.

The story of the Louisiana Purchase is dominated by historical figures with immense personalities. An analysis of these figures isolated from the political institutions and parties they led leaves part of the story untold. For example, the extant explanation for the Federalists’ aggressive stand on western settlers’ right of deposit in New Orleans centers on a personal reaction to Jefferson and the longtime Federalist advocacy of a strong military. But a more electoral approach to this decision reveals a more logical and rational explanation of their perplexing stance. Without a striking policy in defense of the West, the Federalists were likely to cede to the Republicans everything west of the Allegheny Mountains, and with it any hope of again assembling a governing majority. To remain competitive, the Federalists opted to make a play for political support in the West. This action and the Republicans’ reaction suggest that sometime between the Third and Eighth Congresses the parties began to consider more explicitly the electoral ramifications of their decisions. In this sense, the parties of the Jeffersonian era look more similar to the parties of today than the parties of the Washington administration.

This claim does not deny the importance of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison; rather, it encourages social scientists to go beyond the personalities to understand political actions that might have been motivated by institutional or electoral concerns. Rather than rejecting a personality-based explanation, this approach builds upon it by providing a structure for understanding the decisions of the individual actors engaged in the political games of the early American Republic.
Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2002 Policy History Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, and at the 2003 History of Congress Conference, San Diego, California. The author thanks Joe Cooper, Erik Engstrom, George Forgie, Gerald Gamm, Jeff Jenkins, Jennifer Lawless, David Lewis, H. W. Perry, Bartholomew Sparrow, Michael Stoff, the anonymous reviewers, and the editor for helpful comments and suggestions.

Partisan affiliations for the members of Congress were determined by Kenneth C. Martis (1989).

Most historians think Spain was acting upon Napoléon’s orders. Consequently, it was ultimately going to be Napoléon’s policy to defend to the death or not.

Based upon the dataset of historical election returns from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (1999), during the first 10 Congresses, on average, eight “different” parties sent members to the House each Congress. Martis (1989) provides the classification on floor votes. Due to bipolarity created by yes and no votes, Martis includes only two parties per Congress for the first 10 Congresses. See Martis 1989: 13–22 for extensive comments about the various sources used to compile both categorizations.

To determine this percentage, I add together the electoral parties with the most members that comprise the two legislative parties and divide by the total number of House members. In this particular circumstance, I added the 39 members who were elected and organized as Federalists and the 30 members who were elected as Democrats and organized as Republicans and divided by the 115 members who served in the Fourth Congress.

In the House, the difference between 52.5 percent and 61.3 percent is statistically significant ($p < .01$), whereas the difference between 61.3 percent and 63.1 percent is not ($p > .10$). In the Senate, the difference between 60.1 percent and 67.6 percent is not statistically significant ($p > .10$), whereas the difference between 67.6 percent and 80.3 percent is ($p < .05$).

Undoubtedly, the residents of the boardinghouses were not randomly assigned. Members who shared regional interests or ideological predispositions were most likely to live together. I do not introduce complex models to deal with the endogeneity of the boardinghouse variable because that would send this article down a path best taken up in a separate analysis. To test for this conflation, I initially included an interaction term between the ideology and the boardinghouse variables. In none of the models did the results for this interaction term approach statistical significance. As such, I have deleted it from the analysis in the final tables presented throughout this article.

The difference in these percentages is statistically significant at $p < .05$. Cohesion for all Republicans is determined by dividing the more numerous side (pro-Jefferson) by the total number of Republicans voting. The boardinghouse cohesion score was determined by examining the voting patterns of the individual boardinghouses. If one house (Mr. Tunicliff) had two anti-Jefferson votes and three pro-Jefferson votes,
the five Republicans had cohesion scores of 60.0 percent. Likewise if a different house (Mr. Lovell) had eight anti-Jefferson votes and one pro-Jefferson vote, the nine members had cohesion scores of 88.9 percent. The weighted average for all 32 Seventh Congress boardinghouse residents was then determined. To test the variable in multivariate regression, I code it 1 if the Republican lived in a boardinghouse with an anti-Jefferson majority (30.6 percent), 0 if either the boardinghouse was neutral or the member did not live in a boardinghouse during the Seventh Congress (62.4 percent), and −1 if the Republican lived in a pro-Jefferson boardinghouse (7.06 percent).

In another perplexing result, the more pro-Jefferson a state was in the 1800 election, the more likely the Federalist from that state opposed Jefferson in the purchase of Louisiana. The plausibility of the result, however, is questionable given that the relationship does not hold up in the bivariate analysis.

References


