SHIFTING TRENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION: A DEMOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF INCREASING HONDURAN-U.S. IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

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INTRODUCTION

Research on Central American migration to the United States since the 1980s has generally focused on Salvadorans and Guatemalans (e.g., Bailey and Hane 1995; Coutin 1998; Fink 2003; Funkhouser 1992; Hagan 1994; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008; Hamilton and Chincilla 2001; Jones 1989; Menjívar 2000, 2006; Morrison and May 1994). Interest in these flows is in large part due to their origins in revolutionary and counter-insurgency conflicts occurring in those countries in the 1980s (Toussaint 2011; Woodward 2009). The resulting streams of migration within Central America and to the United States created a unique context for studying the causes of emigration, settlement experiences, and transnational practices of migrants, contrasted against the dominant, and largely economically-driven, migration flow from Mexico.

However, compared to Salvadorans and Guatemalans, we know relatively little about Honduran migration processes, an oversight that is increasingly problematic in the face of changing Central American migration flows. By 2000 Hondurans were the third largest Central American immigrant group in the United States, and in the 1990s and 2000s they experienced the fastest growth in their immigrant population (see Table 1). Perhaps more importantly, more Hondurans have been deported by the U.S. government to Central America since 1980 than any other Central American group (U.S. DHS 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010; U.S. INS 1997, 2000, 2002). This trend holds despite the fact that many Hondurans were granted temporary protective status following Hurricane Mitch in 1998 (U.S. INS 1997: Table 59). These escalating patterns over the past several decades raise a number of unanswered questions about Honduran immigration to the United States. Are Honduran migrants different from migrants from other Central American countries, given that Honduras did not experience a political conflict similar to Guatemala, El Salvador, or Nicaragua?[1] Why are Hondurans deported at higher rates than other Central American migrants? Most importantly, how can the increasing immigration and deportation flows between Honduras and the United States inform our understanding of contemporary Central American migration more generally?

To address these questions, we make use of three sets of descriptive comparisons between Honduras and other prominent sending countries. First, we describe flows of immigration and deportation from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua over the past three decades using immigration data from federal statistical yearbooks. Next, we compare noncitizen immigrants from these countries living in the United States using 2000 Census data. Finally, we compare deported Hondurans to deported Salvadorans using recent data collected by a non-profit relief organization in Honduras and data from a recent paper reporting the characteristics of Salvadoran deportees (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008). These three comparisons allow us to gauge the increasing prominence of Hondurans, understand characteristics of this population which may make them uniquely vulnerable to deportation, and speculate about the significance of descriptive differences for Central American migration.

Our analysis suggests that high rates of deportation among Hondurans reflect the particular timing of Honduran migration to the United States. Honduran migration has been steadily increasing for decades, which likely reflects the same set of factors driving other economic migration flows in the North American system, such as uneven development and market changes in Honduras accompanied by growing social networks and job demands in the United States (see Massey et al. 1998: chapters 2 and 3). Honduran migration began to increase rapidly in the 1990s, a decade after similar increases out of El Salvador and Guatemala.

It was also in the 1990s when a set of U.S. policy changes led to a dramatic escalation in migration and border enforcement in the United States

Table 1: Central American Immigrants in the United States by Country of Origin, 1970—2009

	1970			1980			1990			2000			2009		
	Number	Percent Increase*	Emigration Ratio**	Number	Percent Increase	Emigration Ratio	Number	Percent Increase	Emigration Ratio	Number	Percent Increase	Emigration Ratio	Number	Percent Increase	Emigration Ratio
Honduras	19,118	–	7.4	39,154	104.8	11.0	108,923	178.2	22.2	282,852	159.7	45.4	467,943	65.4	62.7
El Salvador	15,717	–	4.6	94,447	500.9	20.9	465,433	392.8	87.3	817,336	75.6	137.5	1,149,895	40.7	186.6
Guatemala	17,356	–	3.3	63,073	263.4	9.1	225,739	257.9	25.3	480,665	112.9	42.8	798,682	66.2	56.9
Nicaragua	16,125	–	8.8	44,166	173.9	17.2	168,659	281.9	40.8	220,335	30.6	43.2	253,250	14.9	44.1

Sources: Gibson and Jung 2006, table 3 (1970-2000); U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey (2009); World Bank Country Populations (1970-2009)

*Percent increases since previous decade in the number of immigrants from each country.

**Ratios are expressed as the number of immigrants in the United States per 1000 people in the sending country.

(Andreas 1999). Our analysis of 2000 U.S. Census data shows that although Honduran noncitizen immigrants in the United States are largely similar to Salvadoran and Guatemalan noncitizen immigrants, they are different in ways that put them at increased risk of deportation: they are younger, more recently arrived, and more vulnerable according to some key socioeconomic indicators. These are precisely the characteristics that define both groups of deportees analyzed in this paper. Put simply, the Central American deportee profile characterizes a greater share of the Honduran noncitizen migrant population in the U.S. The relative recency of the Honduran-U.S. migration flow therefore establishes a greater risk of deportation for Hondurans for two reasons: because the flow has a larger proportion of "early flow" migrants—young, independent, economic migrants—and because the timing of the flow coincided with increased migration enforcement efforts in the United States.

Below, we draw out the details of this story, beginning with a description of the context of Honduran deportation. Specifically, we detail the rise in Honduran migration rates to the United States concurrent with an era of heightened migration enforcement. Then we turn to our comparison of Honduran noncitizen migrants in the United States in 2000 and of Honduran migrants deported to Honduras in the mid-2000s to other Central American migrant and deportee groups. We conclude with a discussion of needed research and unanswered questions about this large, new, and heavily enforced migration flow from Honduras.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF HONDURAN IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

To establish the context of Honduran immigration and deportation, we first describe recent trends in immigration flows out of the major Central American immigrant-sending countries – Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.[2] Table 1 presents the number of immigrants living in the United States from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2009. Two measures are developed to illustrate the increasing magnitude of Honduran migration relative to other flows. The first is the percent increase in the immigrant population originating from each country for each decade, which is helpful for identifying the relative timing of population growth for the four groups of Central American immigrants. The second is an "emigration ratio," which relates the number of immigrants in the United States to the total population in the country of origin, expressed per 1,000 individuals.[3] Thus for example, an emigration ratio of 50 would mean that for each 1,000 people in the country of origin, 50 immigrants were counted in the United States in that year. Our first set of statistical comparisons draws on these three measures – population, percentage increase per decade of Central Americans, and the emigration ratio – to contextualize changing patterns in Central American immigration over the last four decades.

There are three important patterns to note in the table, which address our first question of whether Honduran migration patterns are in some way unique compared to other Central American groups given their distinct political history. First, there has been dramatic growth in the immigrant population of all four countries in recent decades, reflecting broader trends in immigration to the United States following the amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. In 1970, fewer than 20,000 immigrants from each of these countries lived in the United States; in 2009, that number had grown to a quarter million Nicaraguans, half a million Hondurans, three-quarters of a million Guatemalans, and more than a million Salvadorans.

Second, although there were more Guatemalan than Honduran immigrants in the United States in 2009, their respective emigration ratios suggest that the larger Guatemalan population accounts for the larger Guatemalan immigrant population. That is, when adjusted for the size of the population at risk of emigration, Honduras has a higher number of migrants in the United States than Guatemala in 1970, 1980, 2000 and 2009. By 2009, there were 63 Honduran immigrants living in the United States per 1,000 people in Honduras, versus 57 Guatemalan immigrants living in the United States per 1,000 people in Guatemala.

The third important trend from Table 1 is that the timing of immigration differs between the four countries, with Honduras standing out as a later flow relative to the others. The immigrant population from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala grew fastest in the 1970s and 1980s, but in the 1990s it was the Honduran immigrant population that experienced the most rapid growth, more than doubling during that decade. In the 2000s, the growth rates in the immigrant populations declined for all four groups, but Honduras' growth was the fastest of the four. The emigration ratio from Honduras quadrupled over the 1990–2009 interval, outpacing growth from all other nations included in Table 1. Thus, relative to the size of the population in the sending country, the fastest growing population of Central Americans in the United States over the last two decades has been from Honduras.

The recency of the growth in Honduras' immigrant population—occurring primarily in the 1990s and 2000s, as opposed to the 1970s and 1980s—coincides with a dramatic shift in migration policy and enforcement efforts in the United States. Public debate surrounding immigration policy particularly after 2000 restricted channels to legal immigrant status, favored enforcement in the name of national security, and made policy reform a key issue in the 2008 presidential elections (Belton and Morales 2009). Border Patrol appropriations increased from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $3 billion in 2010 (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010; Reyes, Johnson, and Swearingen 2002). Subsequently, the number of border patrol agents along the southwestern border quadrupled, increasing from under 4,000 in 1992 to more than 16,000 in 2008 (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010). Increased enforcement efforts were driven by a series of laws facilitating

the deportation of non-citizen immigrants by the United States government, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008).

One common justification for escalating deportations has been the need for law enforcement agencies to remove violent criminals from the United States. While crimes like murder, drugs, and weapons trafficking were previously considered grounds for deportation on criminal grounds, IIRIRA added nearly thirty separate offenses as "aggravated felonies" for which migrants could be deported. Moreover, IIRIRA made deportation for newly-defined aggravated felonies retroactive without a time limit and included offenses which had not been considered felonies prior to IIRIRA. In a recent report, the Human Rights Watch (2009) analyzed ICE records to find that between 1997 and 2007, over 897,000 non-citizens were deported from the U.S. *after* serving criminal sentences, and that of those deported for crimes (28 percent of all deportees) the most common criminal bases for deportation were entering the U.S. illegally (24 percent), driving under the influence of alcohol (7 percent), assault (6 percent), and immigration crimes such as distributing forged citizenship papers (6 percent). Thus, in spite of the attention given by government officials to the removal of criminal aliens under measures of IIRIRA, non-criminal violations of visa status account for the largest portion of deportations. The current context of increasing restrictions such as Arizona's SB 1070 and other similar proposals advance widespread deportation as a dominant migration policy by directing state resources toward enforcement and increasing penalties for a growing list of criminalized migration violations.

Reflecting this increased logistical and legal faculty for deportation, Figure 1 shows a dramatic increase in deportations of Central American migrants occurring in the late 1990s. From 1975 to 1995, the annual number of deportees reported in the statistical yearbooks of the U.S. INS/DHS was less than 5,000 for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Since 1995, that number has spiked, reaching nearly 30,000 annual deportees for Guatemala and Honduras and 20,000 for El Salvador in 2007.

In addition to this dramatic increase in deportations, it is remarkable to note that in raw numbers, since 2005 more Hondurans have been deported than Salvadorans or Guatemalans. The difference in deportation is even more dramatic when these numbers are adjusted for the population at risk of deportation, which we estimate using the noncitizen immigrant population residing in the United States. In the bottom panel of Figure 1, these deportation ratios are shown.[4] By 2007, the Honduran deportation ratio—9 deportees for every 100 noncitizen Honduran immigrants residing in the United States—was double that of Guatemala and triple that of El Salvador.

These rates of deportation may in part reflect differential recourse to asylum, although this factor likely does not explain patterns in the past

Figure 1. Number of Deportations, 2000–2009, and Deportation Ratios*, 2000–2009, of Hondurans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans from the United States.

Number of Deportations, 2000-2009

Deportation Ratios, 2000-2009

*The deportation ratio is estimated as the annual number of deportations divided by the noncitizen immigrant population living in the United States for each group.

Sources: *Department of Homeland Security Statistical Yearbooks, 1970–2010; U.S. Census 2000 and American Community Survey, 2001–2010*

decade. In the 1990s, many Salvadorans and Guatemalans (and more Nicaraguans) received amnesty as a result of the civil conflict in those countries but, even in those decades, rates of acceptance of amnesty claims were rather low—less than 5 percent for Salvadorans and Guatemalans and as high as 25 percent for Nicaraguans (Russell 1995; McBride 1999). Nevertheless, asylum was not similarly available to Hondurans during this period. In the past decade, however, when the rate of deportation

rose substantially for Hondurans, asylum for Central Americans has been rare—the annual number of Guatemalans and Salvadorans receiving asylum between 2000 and 2010 ranged between 76 and 541 (U.S. DHS 2011).

Unlike political amnesty, which provides permanent residency, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) only provides temporary relief from deportation (as well as work and travel authorization) but no route to permanent legal status. In 1991, Salvadorans were granted TPS for one year, which was extended temporarily through deportation deferral. Following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, TPS was granted to Hondurans and Nicaraguans, and this program has been extended through the present day. However, Salvadorans were granted TPS following earthquakes there in 2001, a program that also has been extended through the present. Since Hondurans are one group benefiting from TPS and Guatemalans are not, it is unlikely that these programs explain the higher rate of deportation of Hondurans from the United States. Rather, given that some Hondurans in the United States who entered without documents are protected by TPS, the rate of deportation from Honduras would be even higher than it is absent this program. Therefore, the question remains: what social or demographic factors can help to explain these increasing rates of deportation that are disproportionately impacting Honduran immigrants in the United States?

To better understand Honduran migration, we now turn to two descriptive and comparative analyses. The first compares Honduran noncitizen migrants in the United States in 2000 to Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Nicaraguan noncitizen immigrants. The second compares Honduran deportees repatriated to Honduras between 2004–2008 to a sample of Salvadoran deportees from the early 2000s. These analyses paint a portrait of recent Honduran migrants and deportees to inform our understanding of what could be driving their increasing migration and rates of deportation.

HONDURAN MIGRANTS IN THE U.S.

Table 2 presents the sociodemographic profiles of non-citizen immigrants from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua captured in the 2000 Census long-form survey. This table shows that these immigrant groups are not dramatically different with respect to some basic sociodemographic measures. All groups have fairly balanced sex ratios, are predominantly young, and have similar marital status distributions. The same proportion, 47 percent, of Honduran, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran immigrants report speaking English well or very well. While a substantial majority of each group (between 63 percent and 66 percent) is in the labor force, all groups are characterized by relatively low levels of education and low income. More than 8 out of 10 Central American non-citizen immigrants from these countries earn less than $2,000 a month, while over a third earn less than $500 monthly.

These similarities speak to common patterns of labor migration to the United States across Central American sending countries despite their distinct political contexts in the 1980s (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991;

Table 2: Sociodemographic, Labor Market, and Geographic Characteristics of Central American Non-Citizen Immigrants in the Unitd States by Country of Origin, 2000

	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala	Nicaragua
Gender				
Female	52.4	53.5	57.9	48.5
Male	47.6	46.5	42.1	51.5
Age				
<18	12.2	9.2	11.6	13.4
18–30	41.8	38.6	41.4	30.7
31–40	26.1	28.8	26.6	25.2
Over 40	19.9	23.5	20.4	30.7
Marital status				
Single	47.9	42.2	45.8	40.3
Married/civil union	41.2	47.4	44.5	46.3
Separated	4.9	4.7	4.2	4.3
Divorced	4.4	3.7	3.4	6.3
Widowed	1.6	2.1	2.0	2.8
Years in the United States				
0 to 5	43.2	23.4	33.4	19.2
6 to 10	26.7	24.2	25.8	17.3
11 to 20	24.9	42.6	33.4	55.9
>20	5.3	7.8	7.4	7.6
English ability				
Not well/none	53.3	53.0	53.2	40.7
Well or very well	46.7	47.0	46.8	59.4
Education				
None/preschool	8.9	13.4	13.6	5.2
Elementary (grades 1–4)	5.7	8.1	8.7	3.8
Junior high school (grades 5–8)	29.4	24.8	27.6	15.5
High school (grades 9–12)	41.5	41.6	37.1	48.9
Post-secondary	14.4	12.1	13.0	26.6
Labor force participation				
No	34.4	36.2	36.9	38.5
Yes	65.7	63.8	63.1	61.5

(Continued)

Table 2: Continued

	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala	Nicaragua
Monthly income				
<$500	42.1	37.7	39.7	40.5
$500-$999	17.0	15.9	16.2	14.8
$1000-$1999	27.9	29.9	29.5	27.1
$2000-$2999	8.3	10.8	9.4	10.9
>$3000	4.7	5.6	5.2	6.8
State of residence				
Arizona	0.6	0.7	1.4	0.5
California	17.6	41.7	43.7	23.8
Florida	17.7	3.0	6.4	50.3
Maryland	1.9	5.4	2.1	1.7
New Jersey	6.6	3.5	4.4	2.7
New York	13.6	9.4	6.5	4.1
North Carolina	5.0	1.6	2.1	0.8
Texas	13.3	13.0	5.6	4.4
Virginia	3.7	7.5	2.7	2.4
Other	20.0	14.3	25.1	9.5
N	9,550	28,137	17,175	7,063

Source: *U.S. Census. 2000 Census of the Population, 5 Percent Public Use File*

Kruckewitt 2005; Stanley 1987). However, there are some notable differences. Hondurans are younger, more likely to be single, and more recently arrived than the other Central American immigrant groups. Over 40 percent of Honduran non-citizen immigrants in the United States in 2000 had arrived after 1995, compared to 20 percent of Nicaraguan, 23 percent of Salvadoran, and 33 percent of Guatemalan non-citizen immigrants. This is not surprising given the patterns discussed in Table 1, which documented that the Honduran immigrant population grew fastest in the United States in the 1990s.

Of the four groups, Nicaraguans stand out as the smallest and also the most unique. Nicaraguans are more likely to be over forty and to have been in the United States longer. Perhaps as a result, a greater proportion (60 percent) of Nicaraguan non-citizen immigrants speaks English well or very well. They are also characterized by higher levels of educational achievement and higher monthly incomes, as one might expect from a more established group of immigrants.

Further, these groups differ substantially in geographic distribution throughout the United States, as shown in Table 2, which also reports the proportion of each group living in nine key U.S. states in 2000. Previous work identified Arizona, California, Maryland, Texas, and Virginia as major states of residence for Salvadoran migrants (Hagan, Eschbach, and

Rodríguez 2008). The Honduran immigrant population is more evenly distributed across the nine states shown in Table 2 than the other groups, who have large concentrations in Florida (Nicaraguans) and California (Salvadorans and Guatemalans). As of 2000, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina all contained more than 5 percent of the Honduran migrant population. The inclusion of North Carolina on this list reflects this state's recent emersion as an immigrant destination (Massey and Capoferro 2008).

HONDURAN DEPORTEES

Thus far, we have documented the rising trends of Honduran immigration and deportation and contrasted Honduran noncitizen immigrants with their Central American peers. To better understand how Honduran deportees compare to other Central American deportees we provide a statistical portrait of recent Honduran deportees. In doing so, we make use of a new and unique dataset compiled between December 2004 and March 2008 in Honduras by the Center for Attention to the Returned Migrant (Centro de Atención al Migrante Retornado, CAMR), a relief organization. Honduran deportees were interviewed by CAMR staff upon arrival in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, the two largest Honduran cities. Deportees were asked about socio-demographic information, family status, work experiences in both the United States and Honduras, remittances sent to Honduras, exit and return experiences, intentions to return to the United States, and general health status.

Data collection occurred across five calendar years (2004–2008) and included 51,364 interviews recorded in more than 100 monthly or submonthly files. CAMR aimed for a complete enumeration of deportees arriving in Honduras in this period. According to federal statistics, there were 109,972 deportations of Hondurans during fiscal years 2004–2008 meaning that the CAMR sample recorded nearly half of all deportations during this period (U.S. DHS 2010, table 38). However, many records lacked a substantial portion of information. The completeness of data collection from interviews varied significantly more between months than within months; in some months, portions of the interview containing more nuanced information (e.g., regarding remittance behavior) were either not conducted or not recorded. Measured across years, the amount of missing data ranged from almost zero for some variables in some years to almost 100 percent of other variables in other years. Taken cumulatively, this suggests that the missing data with CAMR records is more an artifact of changes in data collection over time by CAMR and less due to characteristics of the respondents themselves.

The descriptive strength of the dataset lies in its large-scale effort to document the characteristics and experiences of deportees to Honduras. Our final analysis will compare the sociodemographic profile of this under-researched population to both non-citizen Hondurans living in the United States and also to a sample of Salvadoran deportees. The Salvadoran data

were collected from February 1999 to March 2002 by Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez (2008) in conjunction with a relief organization called "Bienvenido a Casa" (BAC). The BAC sample represents the only other known survey administered to deported Central American migrants and contains similar measures of deportee characteristics to the CAMR dataset.

Survey findings from the CAMR data are detailed in Table 3. The CAMR deportees are compared to Honduran non-citizen immigrants in the United States Census and also to the 300 Salvadoran deportees in the BAC sample. The former represents the comparison group of Hondurans who are "at risk" of deportation due to their citizenship status and the later represents the only available comparison group of Central American deportees. Minors in both the CAMR dataset and the Census were excluded from Table 3 to facilitate comparison with the BAC data, which did not sample migrants under the age of 18 (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008).

According to both samples, the average deportee is a young, recently arrived man with a primary or secondary level of education. Men comprise 88 percent of the Honduran deportee population and 95 percent of the Salvadoran deportee population. Two thirds of Honduran deportees and 56 percent of Salvadoran deportees are under age thirty. Deportees, especially Honduran deportees, are far more likely than noncitizen immigrants to have arrived in the previous five year period.

Those deported to Honduras reported less knowledge of English than Honduran non-citizen residents in the U.S. Census and Salvadoran deportees from the BAC sample. Only about one in four Honduran deportees spoke English well or very well compared to 44 percent of Honduran non-citizen immigrants and nearly half (52 percent) of Salvadoran deportees. While this may be a reflection of less time spent in the United States on average by those deported, the deportees in the CAMR dataset also had lower levels of education than their non deported Honduran peers and those deported to El Salvador. Among adults in the CAMR sample, 95 percent had less than a high school education as compared with 40 percent of noncitizen residents from Honduras in the Census and 84 percent of Salvadoran deportees (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008). Thus, in addition to being younger and having spent less time in the United States, those facing detention and forced repatriation to Honduras were also more likely to speak English poorly or not at all and to have very low levels of education.

In light of variation in migration enforcement in various parts of the United States, it is important to consider where migrants are detained and how these areas of detention and deportation compare to where noncitizen residents live in the United States. For example, as Table 3 shows, although less than one percent of Hondurans in the Census live in Arizona, nearly 10 percent Honduran deportees were forcibly repatriated from that state. Despite the perception of high migration enforcement in California, a relatively small proportion of Hondurans (7 percent) were deported from

Table 3: Sociodemographic and Deportation Characteristics of CAMR & BAC Deportees and Census 2000 Characteristics of Resident Noncitizen Immigrants from Honduras in the U.S.

	Honduras		El Salvador
	CAMR Deportee Dataset	U.S. Census	BAC Sample
Gender			
Male	88.7	52.8	95
Female	11.3	47.2	5
Age			
18-30	63.8	47.6	56
31-40	25.9	29.7	27
Over 40	10.3	22.7	16
Marital Status			
Single	56.1	41.1	44
Married/civil union	42.8	46.7	49
Divorced	0.9	5.0	-
Separated	-	5.5	-
Widowed	0.3	1.8	-
Years in the United States			
0 to 5	89.2	39.9	43
6 to 10	5.7	27.2	16
11 to 20	3.1	26.9	29
Over 20	1.9	6.0	9
English ability			
Not well/none	72.9	55.7	46
Well or very well	27.1	44.3	52
Education			
None	6.1	8.1	16
Primary	67.1	3.6	20
Secondary	21.4	28.1	48
High school	1.8	43.9	12
College or higher	3.5	16.4	-
State from which deported			
Arizona	9.5	0.6	9
California	6.9	17.1	30
Florida	4.8	17.8	-
Maryland	0.3	2.0	2
New Jersey	0.4	6.6	-
New York	2.6	13.8	-
North Carolina	2.5	5.2	-
Texas	57.4	13.1	28

(Continued)

Table 3: Continued

	Honduras		
	CAMR Deportee Dataset	**U.S. Census**	**El Salvador BAC Sample**
Virginia	1.3	4.0	6
Other	14.8	19.9	18
Reason for deportation			
Immigration violation	93.0	-	56
Crime	0.6	-	43
Not Reported	6.4	-	2.0
Employed in Honduras prior to emigration	84.6	-	-
Employed in United States prior to deportation	54.8	66.8	-
Monthly income			
<$ 500	0.9	34.6	-
$ 500-$999	9.3	19.1	-
$ 1000-$1999	30.6	31.7	-
$ 2000-$2999	34.2	9.4	-
>$ 3000	25	5.3	-
Sent remittances	0.90	-	-
Frequency of remittances			
Weekly	1	-	-
Biweekly	4.4	-	-
Monthly	58.9	-	-
Less than monthly	35.7	-	-
Monthly amount of remittances			
<$ 100	7.2	-	-
$ 100-$199	13.2	-	-
$ 200-$499	44.1	-	-
$ 500-$999	27	-	-
>$ 1000	8.5	-	-
Purpose of remittances			
Help family	96.8	-	-
Buy a home	1.9	-	-
Savings, business, or other	1.3	-	-

Source: *Center for Attention to the Returned Migrant (CAMR) Survey (n = 51,364); U.S. Census. 2000 Census of the Population, 5 percent Public Use File (n = 9,550); Hagan et al. 2008, Table 1 and 4 (n = 300)*

this state compared with the 17 percent of Honduran non-citizen immigrants who report living there in the 2000 Census. In contrast, although 30 percent of Salvadorans in the BAC survey were deported from California, 42 percent of Salvadorans reside in California, making these levels of deportation actually somewhat low. In the U.S. Census, Florida and New York report 18 percent and 14 percent of the Honduran residents, respectively, yet both deported less than 5 percent of the CAMR deportees. Some states, however, deport extremely heavily with respect to the number of Hondurans residing in the state. Although 13 percent of both the Honduran and Salvadoran non-citizen immigrants live in Texas, well over half (57 percent) of those in the CAMR sample (2004–2008) but only 28 percent of the BAC (1999–2002) sample were deported from this border state. The very high rates of deportation from Texas and lower relative rates of deportation from California and Arizona may be partially due to divergent routes into the United States for the recently arrived; however, it is likely that these rates are heavily affected by the recent boom in the private and public detention, jailing, and deportation sector that has arisen in Texas in particular since the passing of IIRIRA in 1996 (Barry 2009; Rodríguez and Hagan 2004).

Provocatively, less than one percent of the CAMR deportees reported being deported because of a crime, compared with 43 percent of those in the Salvadoran survey of deportees (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodríguez 2008). Given that 93 percent of those deported to Honduras cited immigration violations as the reason for their deportation, it may be that an underreporting of crime as a motive for deportation reflects a disconnect between perceptions of crime and the deportation of noncitizens for the more minor offenses which were newly incorporated under IIRIRA as legal grounds for deportation.

Comparable proportions of each group of deportees stated an intention to return to the United States. Nearly 40 percent of Hondurans and 43 percent of Salvadorans discussed plans to re-enter the United States. It is worth noting that following deportation, re-migrating is considered a crime punishable with deportation. Faced with these penalties, the substantial proportion of Central American migrants in both of these samples who intend to re-migrate suggests that many of the deported are highly invested in their lives in the United States.

A unique feature of the CAMR dataset is that it includes reports of remitting behaviors of migrants back to Honduras while in the United States. The importance of remittances to the economies of many Central American countries in particular has become somewhat of a flashpoint in the debate on migration policy (Baumeister 2006; Chami, Fullenkamp, and JahJah 2005; De Haas 2005; Grabel 2008; Noguera 1999). Table 3 shows the reported occupational history and remittance sending behavior of the deported Honduran migrants.

Eighty-five percent of the deported had participated in the Honduran labor force prior to emigration and more than half of the deported

migrants (55 percent) worked in the United States prior to deportation, compared with 67 percent of Honduran non-citizen residents who participate in the U.S. labor force according to the 2000 Census. Deported Hondurans reported higher incomes than non-citizen residents in the 2000 Census. Roughly 60 percent of deported Hondurans reporting incomes said they earned more than $2,000 monthly as opposed to roughly 15 percent of non-deported Hondurans. Further, while comparable proportions from both populations (31 percent of deportees and 32 percent of non-deportees) had earnings of $1,000-$2,000 monthly, deported Hondurans reported higher incomes overall than those reported by their non-deported peers.

The CAMR analysis shows that the majority (90 percent) of deported Hondurans were sending remittances to Honduras. Most migrants (59 percent) sent remittances monthly while a substantial portion sent remittances less than monthly (36 percent). The average amount of remitted income sent to Honduras on a monthly basis varied substantially, yet the purpose of these sizable portions of income was nearly universally to support family in Honduras (97 percent). Less than two percent of remitters were investing funds specifically in buying a home or saving for a business. Of those remitting, 45 percent of migrants sent $200-$400 of their monthly income to Honduras while 27 percent sent $500-$900 monthly. Twenty percent of the remitting migrants sent less than $200 dollars but nearly 9 percent were able to send $1000 per month. Thus, overwhelmingly, deported migrants in the CAMR dataset are young workers remitting fairly large portions of their earnings home with the expressed purpose of aiding family. Interestingly, the reported incomes for the deported are often higher than the non-deported, suggesting that Honduran families may be disproportionately disadvantaged by losing the economic stability offered by remitting relatives abroad who are then deported home.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Research on Central American migration has paid little attention to Honduras as a sending country, perhaps because it did not experience the same degree of political conflict in the 1980s as did its neighbors El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In this paper we have shown that this research omission overlooks not only an increasingly sizable group, but one that is distinct from its Central American neighbors in its experience with immigration to and deportation from the United States. In this section we draw out the substantive meaning of our findings as they relate to future migration trends and we suggest new directions for research.

The three statistical comparisons that comprise this study have served to (1) highlight the increasing magnitude of Hondurans among U.S. immigrants and deportees in particular, (2) identify similarities and differences between Hondurans and other prominent Central American sending countries, and (3) document the social and demographic characteristics

of Honduran deportees. These three comparisons underscore linkages between migration and deportation selection processes. Taken together, characteristics of the Honduran immigrant and deportee populations simultaneously indicate higher vulnerability to deportation and the continued increase of migration flows in the future, with important implications. In absolute numbers, Honduras sends the third most migrants to the United States among all Central American countries, after El Salvador and Guatemala. However, taking into consideration the population of the sending country, more Honduran emigrants reside in the United States than from any other Central American country. Similarly, in recent years, Hondurans have been the most deported Central American migrants according to both absolute and relative measures. Why then have Hondurans been disproportionately affected by increases in migration enforcement in recent years?

Our analysis of federal immigration statistics and of non-citizen immigrants residing in the U.S. reveals a perfect storm of historical, demographic, and political factors yielding high rates of both migration and deportation of Hondurans. The timing of Honduran migration creates two unique circumstances resulting in their high levels of deportation. First, the decadal lag in the peak of their immigration flow means that most Hondurans were entering the United States during the era of immigration enforcement, in the 1990s and 2000s, whereas Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans began immigrating in large numbers in the 1980s. Second, as a result of the recency of this flow, Hondurans have social and demographic characteristics that are associated with early, labor-driven migrants and also with increased risk of being deported. The theory of cumulative causation describes how the strong selection of economically-active male migrants recedes at the same time that social networks and transnational systems become more salient in predicting migration. Thus, over time the profile of immigrants becomes increasingly diverse (Massey et al. 1994). In this case, the growing population of Honduran migrants and deportees in particular still closely fit the profile of economic migrants who are less advantaged in terms of obtaining visas through the legal social capital of family members already residing legally in the United States.

Put simply, the sociodemographic profile of deportees characterizes a larger share of the Honduran non-citizen immigrant population in the United States than the other Central American groups considered. Compared with other prominent groups of Central American immigrants in the U.S., Hondurans are more likely to be young males with a limited English ability, and a lower socioeconomic status. Also characteristic of recent flows of migrants (Massey and Capoferro 2008), Hondurans are more geographically dispersed than groups arriving with earlier waves of migrants. As others have suggested, reliance on social networks and transnational communities is one strategy for acclimation to life in the United States (Menjívar 2000). This may suggest that these new arrivers are less likely to be incorporated into large and established communities of Central

American immigrants in the U.S. and less protected by the resources (including access to legal status) accumulated by such networks.

Finally, given the increases in the churning of migrants and deportees between the U.S. and Honduras, we consider the implications of our analysis for Central American migration in the future. Three trends are worth noting. First, given the profile of Honduran non-citizen immigrants in the United States, the theory of cumulative causation can inform our expectation that in coming years, the Honduran immigrant population will continue to grow and further will diversify demographically. In other words, it is likely that migration feedback loops, including the generation of migrant networks and changing economic and social conditions in sending communities, will contribute to the continuation of Honduran migration.

Second, because the majority of migrants deported to Honduras reported sending remittances to support family, increases in deportation may be cutting off an important source of income for underdeveloped communities (Chami, Fullencamp, and Jahjah 2005; De Haas 2005; Grabel 2008; Noguera 1999). Third, given the high stakes involved for Central American migrants, punitive migration policies may also have the unintended consequence of turning Honduran short-term migrant trips into longer and potentially permanent stays. Because the risk of deportation increases the costs associated with undocumented migration, migrants must extend their trips in order to reach their target earnings, leading to longer stays, a pattern that has been documented for Mexican immigrants (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal 2009). The cost of border crossing also means that cross-border movement, such as trips back home, becomes less frequent, contributing to the separation of families across borders and the potential for permanent establishment in the United States. Thus, while disrupting flows of financial support from remitting family members in the U.S. in the short term, escalating deportations have the potential to also increase permanent migration in the long term.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, this work represents a descriptive snapshot of an understudied migration flow informed by both migration theory and population trends over the last several decades. The unique demographic and political conditions contextualizing Honduran migration have resulted in a swelling flow of primarily economic migrants who are disproportionately being forced back to their country of origin. Ironically, many of the same features which characterize this population both anticipate future increases in migration and also produce a heightened state of vulnerability to deportation among Hondurans. In light of these trends, it is our hope that drawing scholarly attention to the shifting quantitative trends will instigate future work on Honduran migration.

From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that there is a large degree of inutility in escalating deportation, particularly when similar

factors are selecting both migrants and deportees. Secondly, this increased "churning" of newly arriving migrants and newly departing deportees has enormous potential for increased harm given the well established negative consequences of deportation for the disruption of communities, families, and individuals (Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari 2010; Noguera 1999; Dodson and Schmalzbauer 2005). Given that the vast majority of Honduran deportees are not deported on criminal charges, this raises the question of the effectiveness of resources committed to deportation, as opposed to legal programs to facilitate the temporary migration of labor migrants. Thus, policy makers and researchers alike would do well to reframe their understandings of both migration and deportation and to move towards conceptualizing these processes as linked. This would recognize that the contextual factors associated with deportation are not independent of those which give rise to large numbers of particularly undocumented migrants in the first place.

The analysis presented here faces two statistical obstacles. First, in calculating rates of migration, we rely on the Census Bureau's decennial Census and American Community Survey. Although these sources represent the only available data, Census data undercount undocumented immigrants (Warren and Passel 1987; de la Puente 1995). Moreover, recent immigrants are more likely to be undercounted in Census figures (Edmonston 2002). Therefore, our estimate of the non-Honduran noncitizen immigrant population may represent a conservative estimate.[5] Secondly, one of the major limitations of the CAMR dataset and subsequent analysis was that the surveying was done not by ethnographers or social demographers but by a relief organization. While this presented certain challenges to compiling the dataset and interpreting analyses, what is more important with respect to deportation is that the impetus to collect data to address the circumstances and needs of deported migrants is being generated from the grassroots up. Looking toward the future, increasing political instability in the years following data collection in Honduras including the 2009 military coup may continue to affect patterns of migration and deportation from and back to Honduras. Thus, important work remains to be done documenting the characteristics and experiences of the important group we have highlighted here at a unique time of intense migrations, deportations, and contemporary political instability.

In similar fashion, the theoretical tools available for unpacking the selection of deportees from the non-citizen immigrant population are underdeveloped compared to those available to researchers for understanding migrant selection processes. Our analyses of the best available national statistics have been informed by previous research concerning labor migration, political conflicts, and cumulative causation. More work remains to be done for researchers to think theoretically about the increasingly prevalent practice of deportation. However by showing that many of the sociodemographic attributes which characterize the growing numbers of

Honduran migrants may also systematically yield a population dispro-portionately affected by deportation, we make a first step toward building a scholarly understanding of migration and deportation as linked pro-cesses.

Endnotes
[1] Honduras was not entirely exempt from the violence that affected other Central American countries. In addition to receiving refugees from neigh-boring countries, Honduras experienced repression, militarization, and human rights abuses in the 1980s. This history is carefully detailed by Joan Kruckewitt in a chapter of "When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror", edited by Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez (2005).
[2] There were fewer immigrants from Panama, Costa Rica, and Belize, com-bined, living in the United States in 2009 than there were from Nicaragua alone.
[3] This is an emigration ratio, rather than a rate, because we have an impre-cise estimate of actual events (emigrations) occurring in the year for which the ratio is estimated. The number of immigrants from each country living in the United States in each decennial year includes immigrants living in the United States in that year who arrived in any year prior to that year.
[4] Again, this is a deportation ratio, rather than a rate, because we have an imprecise estimate of the population at risk of deportation. The nonciti-zen immigrant population in the United States counted in the American Communities Survey excludes institutionalized people and those living in group housing, including incarcerated migrants who are in deporta-tion proceedings. The ACS, like other federal surveys, also undercounts non-institutionalized, undocumented migrants (Warren and Passel 1987). Previous ethnographic researchers have offered a variety of explanations for the undercount of undocumented migrants including fear and conceal-ment, cultural differences, literacy limitations, housing arrangements, and household impermanence or mobility (de la Puente 1995).
[5] Effectively, this would imply that our estimates of Honduran migration in table 1 are conservative, and the actual number of emigrants and the emigration ratio for Honduran deportees in the U.S. compared with the population of Honduras is higher than that presented. Alternatively, un-dercounting the number of Honduran immigrants in the United States would yield a more generous estimate of the deportation ratio in the sec-ond panel of figure 1. However, in absolute numbers the largest share of deportees in recent years has been from Honduras.

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