

**Dr. Randall S. Geller**  
**Israeli Intelligence and Espionage**  
**J S 365 (40248), GOV 365N (38948)**  
**Tuesdays and Thursdays, 11 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.**  
**Spring 2013**  
**Classroom: Mezes Hall room 1.202**

Office hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1:30 – 3 p.m. or by appointment.  
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**Title: Israeli Intelligence and Espionage**

**Course Description:**

In order to understand how a tiny, mostly Jewish state has survived in the Middle East despite a multiplicity of threats ever since it was founded in 1948, it is imperative to understand the role of its intelligence services in assessing threats, acquiring agents, deceiving enemies, and assisting in the evaluation and promulgation of security measures designed to protect the state. Beginning with its origins in the pre-state era (prior to 1948) and proceeding in a chronological manner up to the present day, we will explore the history and evolution of Israel's intelligence community; in the process, we will examine the leadership and structure of the Mossad, Shin Bet, and Military Intelligence, and analyze specific operational missions overseen by them during war and peace. We will explore how Israeli intelligence agents have formed relationships with both state and non-state actors and how in certain cases, its agents have penetrated the highest levels of the political and military structures of neighboring Middle Eastern states. We will also investigate bungled assassination attempts that have led to severe embarrassment for the state and resulted in the capture of Israeli agents in Arab countries.

In the process of examining the activities and cover stories agents had to create in hostile environments, we will learn about the extraordinary history of the modern Middle East through a unique lens; the lens of a minority under threat but determined to survive and thrive. In every situation, we will see that Israel's intelligence community encountered extraordinarily difficult dilemmas and challenges when trying to formulate an appropriate response to a given action against the state or its citizens. Complicating matters was the fact that Israel's intelligence services, like America's, operate in a democratic society with civilian oversight and under the spotlight of media glare.

This course will be historical in nature and discussion based; on Tuesday we will have a lecture, and on Thursdays we will discuss and debate the week's assigned readings and the ideas therein. At every juncture, we will ask; was a particular operation undertaken by Israel's intelligence services the right approach to take in response to the given situation? What else could have been done, if anything? How does the particular action under review illuminate the history of Israel's unique place in the modern Middle East?

Video will be used in class in order to illuminate this controversial yet important aspect of Israel's ongoing

quest for security. Several movies dealing with Israeli intelligence exploits will be screened outside of class time at a time convenient for students; arrangements can and will be made for students who cannot attend due to scheduling conflicts.

**Course Requirements:**

1). Class Participation – 20%. You will want to participate in this class, I’m sure! The readings and issues that arise here are complex, interesting, and exciting. Attendance is part of your participation. There should be no more than 5 unexcused absences. Attendance and participation are important factors in contributing to the class and helping you succeed.

2). Response Papers – 20%. Except for the first week of class, the week of the midterm, and the two weeks before the final exam, students should turn in a short response paper based on a question related to the readings. There are a total of 10 response papers altogether. Response papers should be no more than 1 to a maximum of 2 pages, double spaced, and are due at the end of class on most Thursdays. Grades will be between a 0 and a 2, with 2 being the highest.

Think of this as your weekly “Intelligence Assessment.”

Response papers are due on the following Thursdays: January 24, January 31, February 7, February 14, February 21, March 7, March 21, March 28, April 4, April 11.

3). Midterm Exam – 30%. The midterm will consist of a series of short answer questions as well as two essay questions. You will be given a review sheet several weeks in advance of the midterm that will help you prepare for the exam. You may turn in the essay portions of your midterm prior to the midterm exam date, if you wish. I will of course be available for consultation regarding any questions you may have.

This exam will be administered on Thursday, February 28.

4). Final Exam – 30%. The final will follow precisely the same format as the midterm exam, but the final will be cumulative in nature (with emphasis on the second half of the semester).

The Final exam will be administered on Friday, May 10, from 9 a.m. – 12 p.m.

**Attendance and Essay Requirements:** Midterm and final exam essays should be turned both in hard copy as well as by e-mail, while weekly short papers only need be turned in hard copy. The midterm and final essays should include citations from the assigned readings, while the weekly papers are short enough that citations are optional, although points from the readings should be referenced. Chicago Style is the preferred method of citation, but whatever citation style you use, it must include the author, title of the book or article, year of publication, and page number of the book or article you are citing. MLA will not be accepted as a method of citation. When citing the same source a second time, you may simply write, for example, “Byman, p. 22.” Footnotes or endnotes are accepted.

It is preferable you cite the lectures as well when using them for your papers, but that is not essential.

You should try to make every class. Occasionally that can't happen during the course of a semester, but 5 absences over the course of the semester will be grounds for failure. Obviously, excellent attendance and participation will have a strong and positive impact on your grade! You should always be on time for class; the beginning is when we set the tone for the day's class, discuss class updates and news, as well as news and current events relevant to Israeli intelligence and Middle Eastern strategy.

Computers are not permitted for note taking during class, unless there is a special need for one that is documented and described. The same is true of cell phones or I-pads, Kindles, etc.

Without a verifiable medical excuse from the campus health center or a local doctor, late papers will receive reduced grades. Each day late the paper will be reduced by 1/3 of a grade. That means, if your paper was worthy of an A but is turned in 3 days late, it will receive a B. Also, it looks much better for you as a student to get all of your papers in on time without excuses. You should be working on papers well ahead of time, so please do not ask for extensions the night before because something came up – they will not be granted. If you are having difficulty writing a paper I should know about it well in advance. Therefore, visits to office hours are strongly encouraged for all students.

### **Course Readings:**

This course will consist of 3 assigned books that will be available at the university Coop. The books assigned are written both by scholars and intelligence chiefs and analysts. You have also been assigned chapters of books that are available in electronic format through the UT library web site. As you may know, they are accessible to all students free of charge. Many of the readings will consist of journal articles and they will be available on Blackboard under Course Documents. Readings from newspapers can be linked directly through the online syllabus.

If there is a particular student interest in a topic not covered in class, readings and topics can be amended to reflect that. We will figure that out together. But in the meantime, I trust and believe the topics and readings here will provide a fascinating glimpse into the intricacies and complexities of the Israeli intelligence structure.

The books are as follows:

Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services (Grove Press, 1992).

Daniel Byman, A High Price: the Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with the Man who Led the Mossad (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006).

### **Accommodations:**

The University of Texas at Austin provides upon request appropriate academic accommodations for qualified students with disabilities. For more information, contact the Office of the Dean of Students at 471-6259, <http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd/>.

**January 15 and 17 - This week we will have an introductory overview of the class, and we will also explore the process of building a pre-state (before 1948) Intelligence system:**

### **Readings:**

1). Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows, (University of Chicago Press, 2007) – Chs, 1, 6, 7. (Online Access Through UT Library)

**January 22 and 24 – We will evaluate the security services’ role in the creation of the state, covert contacts with Arabs during the 1948 War, and the activation, and ultimately capture of a remarkable Israeli-operated spy ring in Egypt in the 1950s.**

**Readings:**

1). Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows, (University of Chicago Press, 2007), Ch. 9 (pp. 230-258) – Online Access Through UT Library

2). Byman, pp. 18-25

3). Shlomo Nakdimon, “Operation Suzanna (1954), in Gilboa and Lapid, pp. 49-58

4). Ian Black and Benny Morris, pp. 107-117

5). “Israel honors Egyptian spies 50 years after fiasco”:

<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1378350/posts>

**Recommended for Background:**

1). Amir Bar-Or, “The Evolution of the Army’s Role in Israeli Strategic Planning: A Documentary Record,” *Israel Studies*, Fall 1996, Vol. 1 Issue 2, pp. 98-121

2). Zaki Shalom, “Strategy in Debate: Arab Infiltration and Israeli Strategic Planning in the Early 1950s,” *Israel Affairs*, 2002

**January 29 and 31 – Building a Relationship with France in the 1950s and 1960s, the Capture of Nazi War Criminal Adolf Eichmann and Bringing him to Trial in Israel, 1960-1962, Countering German Scientists Working for Egypt in the Early 1960s.**

**Readings:**

1). Black and Morris, pp. 188-201

2). Avner Avrahami, “Maybe was not an Option,” *Haaretz*, May 6, 2010

<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/maybe-was-not-an-option-1.288771>

3). Julian Borger, “Why Israel's capture of Eichmann caused panic at the CIA: Information that could have led to Nazi war criminal was kept under wraps.” *The Guardian*, Wednesday 7 June 2006.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jun/08/secondworldwar.usa>

4). On Ricardo Eichmann:

<http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/adolf-eichmann-is-a-historical-figure-to-me-ricardo-eichmann-speaks-to-suzanne-glass-about-growing-up-the-fatherless-son-of-the-nazi-war-criminal-hanged-in-israel->

[1595146.html](#)

5). Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 55-78 (online access through UT library)

**Recommended for Background:**

Guy Ziv, "Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance, 1954-9," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 45:2 (April 2010), pp. 406-429.

**Feb. 5 and 7 – The Shin Bet Internal Security Service and the Arab Population Within the State of Israel Until 1967. We'll explore how Israel acquired agents among the Arab Population, and why Arabs would Agree to Secretly Work for Israel During the First Two Decades of the State's Existence. We'll also Discuss the Remarkable but True Story of the Founding of a Unit Consisting of Arabic-Speaking Jews who Agreed to Live in Arab Villages as Arabs – and even married Arab Women in order to Maintain Their Cover. Finally, we'll also Discuss Efforts by Foreign Intelligence Agencies to Place their own People within Israel.**

1). Hillel Cohen, *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), Introduction, Ch. 1, and pp. 159-194 (Online Access Through UT Library Website)

2). Mista'aravim: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4031176,00.html>

**Recommended for Background:**

1). The KGB in Israel:

Shlomo Spiro, "KGB Human Intelligence Operations in Israel, 1948-1973," *Intelligence and National Security* 26:6 (2011), pp. 864-885.

**Feb. 12 and 14 – Placing Israeli Agents and Acquiring Arab Agents for Israel in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq Between 1960-1967: Eli Cohen, Wolfgang Lotz, Munir Redfa, Rifaat al-Gamal**

1). Black and Morris, pp. 205-210 (Munir Redfa), pp. 226-229 (Eli Cohen)

2). Ella Florsheim and Avi Shilon, "The Handler," *Azure*, Winter 2006.

3). Ephraim Lapid, "Collecting Information in Preparation for the Six-Day War (1967)," in Gilboa and Lapid, pp. 65-70.

**The following are short newspaper articles (1-2 pages each) relevant to the class:**

1). Munir Redfa –

<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3405913,00.html>

2). Yossi Melman, "How Israel Won the Six Day War," *Haaretz*, March 31, 2011.

<http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/2.294/how-israel-won-the-six-day-war-1.353213>

3). Wolfgang Lotz, an Israeli Spy in Egypt:

<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/double-dad-1.215093>

**Feb. 19 and 21 – An Analysis of Israeli Intelligence Gathering and Operations During the 1967 War**

- 1). Black and Morris, pp. 206-226, 230-235
- 2). David S. Robarge, "CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," *Studies in Intelligence* 49 (2005); download this at [https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol49no1/html\\_files/arab\\_israeli\\_war\\_1.html](https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol49no1/html_files/arab_israeli_war_1.html)

**Recommended for Background:**

- 1). Guy Laron, "Playing with Fire: The Soviet-Syrian-Israeli Triangle," *Cold War History*. May 2010, 10:2, pp. 163-184.

**February 26 and 28 – The Shin Bet Internal Security Force Operates Among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 1967-1973. We'll also Analyze Intelligence Gathering and Operations on the Border with Egypt After 1967.**

- 1). Black and Morris, pp. 236-262
- 2). Byman, pp. 29-39
- 3). Dima Adamsky and Uri Bar-Joseph, "'The Russians are not coming': Israel's Intelligence Failure and the Soviet Military Intervention in the 'War of Attrition'," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 1-25.

**The Mossad Goes to Work: International Operations After 1967: Escaping with Five Missile Boats from Cherbourg, France; the Munich massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes, September, 1972, and Mossad retaliation throughout Europe and the Middle East.**

**Readings:**

- 1). Black and Morris, pp. 263-281
- 2). Byman, pp. 39-54
- 3). Abraham Rabinovich, "Escape from Cherbourg," *The Jerusalem Post*, December 24, 2009.  
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2422033/posts>
- 4). Janet Maslin, "A Massacre in Munich, and What Came After" *The New York Times*, December 15, 2005.  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/books/15masl.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/books/15masl.html?_r=0)

**Recommended:**

1). Raphael Ahren, "Germany had a Tip-Off Three Weeks ahead of Munich Massacre, Der Spiegel Claims," *The Times of Israel*, July 22, 2012.

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/germany-had-a-tip-off-three-weeks-in-advance-that-palestinians-were-planning-incident-at-munich-olympics-but-failed-to-act-der-spiegel-claims/>

2). Lisa Beyer, "The Myths and Realities of Munich," *Time*, December 4, 2005.

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1137646,00.html>

### **Midterm Exam, Thursday, February 28.**

#### **March 5 and 7 – The Costs of Miscalculation: the Mossad, Israeli military Intelligence, and the 1973 War**

##### **Readings:**

1). Black and Morris, pp. 282-321

2). Uri Bar-Joseph and Jack S. Levy, "Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 2009, Vol. 124 Issue 3, pp. 461-488.

3). Ashraf Marwan, Son in Law of Egypt's Former Leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, Turns Out to be an Israeli Spy: See Yossi Melman, "The Truth About Israel's Egyptian Agent," *Haaretz*, December 17, 2010.

<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/the-truth-about-israel-s-egyptian-agent-1.331117>

Video to be Watched in Class - CBS News – "Was the Perfect Spy a Double Agent?" May 12, 2009.

[http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560\\_162-4999386.html](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-4999386.html)

##### **Recommended:**

1). Or Honig, "Surprise Attacks - are They Inevitable? Moving Beyond the Orthodox-Revisionist Dichotomy," *Security Studies*, Jan-Mar2008, Vol. 17 Issue 1, pp. 72-106.

2). Uri Bar-Joseph, "Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur Era," *Israel Affairs*, January 2008, Vol. 14 Issue 1, pp. 70-83

#### **March 12 and 14 – Spring Break – No Class**

#### **March 19 and 21 – Rescuing Hostages and Eliminating Threats: the Entebbe Rescue, July 4, 1976, and the Raid on the Osirak Reactor in Iraq, 1981.**

##### **Forming Alliances with the Christian minority in Lebanon**

##### **Readings:**

1). Black and Morris, pp. 339-342, 332-337

2). Byman, pp. 54-57

3). Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Point of No Return," *The Atlantic*, September 2010

[http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/308186/?single\\_page=true](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/308186/?single_page=true)

4). Laurie Eisenberg, "History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon," *Israel Affairs*, October 2009.

Video on 1981 raid on Osirak

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95Tu4sbJ7Co>

Or -

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3Ht7B1UzbM>

**Recommended for Background:**

1). Jeremy Josephs, "Michel Bacos: the Air France Hero of Entebbe," *The Jewish Chronicle*, June 15, 2012

<http://www.thejc.com/lifestyle/interviews/68894/michel-bacos-air-france-hero-entebbe>

**March 26 and 28 – Military Intelligence Operating in the Lebanese Arena; Hizballah, Iran and the Syrians.**

**Readings:**

1). Byman, pp. 209-265

2). Amos Gilboa (Former Military Intelligence Division Chief), "Intelligence and the Lebanese Arena," in Gilboa and Lapid, pp. 109-121 (To be posted online)

3). Uri Bar-Joseph, "Israel's Military Intelligence Performance During the Second Lebanon War," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Volume 20, Issue 4, August 2007, pages 583-601

**Recommended for Background:**

1). Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations," *Israel Studies*, Fall 2010, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p163-188.

2). Eyal Zisser, "The Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese Triangle: the Renewed Struggle Over Lebanon," *Israel Affairs*, Oct2009, Vol. 15 Issue 4, pp. 397-412.

**April 2 and 4 - Secret Intelligence Contacts with the Palestinians and Jordanians; 1991-2003**

**Readings:**



- 1). Byman, pp. 113-155
- 2). Halevy, pp. 80-118, 156-177, 199-216

**April 9 and 11 – Intelligence Dilemmas and Challenges of Dealing with the Hamas Movement Since 2003;**

- 1). Byman, pp. 156-205

**Recommended:**

- 1). Halevy, pp. 234-249
- 2). Amir Baram, “The Gaza Effect,” *Defence Studies*, March 2011, Vol. 11 Issue 1, pp. 66-95

**April 16 and 18 – Extraordinary Stories of Conversion and Betrayal**

- 1). Mosab Hussan Yousef in Haaretz Magazine, Feb. 26, 2010 (in IMRA)

<http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=47356>

- 2). Mosab Yousef, interview with his Shin Bet handler, May 13, 2010

<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/shin-bet-agent-discusses-his-special-relationship-with-a-hamas-spy-1.290215>

- 3). Assaf Ben-David – an Arab convert to Judaism

<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3465750,00.html>

- 4). Another Arab convert to Haredi Judaism, who was a Palestinian by day and a Religious Jew at night

<http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/266/575.html?hp=1&cat=402&loc=12>

**Recommended for Additional Reading:**

- 1). More on Assaf Ben-David

[http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-30-535950028\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-30-535950028_x.htm)

[http://www.blzn.com/news/2007/01/23/Israeli\\_charged\\_terror\\_plan\\_plan.html](http://www.blzn.com/news/2007/01/23/Israeli_charged_terror_plan_plan.html)

- 2). Mosab Hassan Youssef, Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices (Salt River, 2011) E-book available.

**April 23 and 25 – Israeli Intelligence Dilemmas.**

**Readings:**

- 1). Byman, A High Price, pp. 297-361
- 2). Yosef Kuperwasser, “Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence Reforms,” *Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution*, Analysis Paper, Number 14, October 2007.
- 3). Shlomo Spiro, “No Place to Hide: Intelligence and Civil Liberties in Israel,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19:4, 2006.

**Recommended:**

Ian Sipercio, “Shield of David: the Promise of Israeli National Missile Defense,” *Middle East Policy*, Summer 2010, Vol. 17 Issue 2, pp. 127-141.

**April 30 and May 2 - Review and Conclusions**

Byman, pp. 362-381

Thomas H. Henriksen, “Security Lessons from the Israeli Trenches,” *Policy Review.*, Feb/Mar2007, Issue 141, pp. 17-31.

**Final Exam – Friday, May 10, 9 a.m. – 12 p.m.**