This paper deals with what I call the JBo-X DM-Y construction (ex.1: *Just because of one incident doesn’t mean he doesn’t deserve the award*). While the JB-X DM-Y construction (ex.2: *Just because I’m a linguist doesn’t mean that I speak many languages*) has been analyzed in detail, our construction has received little attention, partly because of its substandard nature. Matsuyama (2001), for example, argues that the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not acceptable from a generative point of view. In contrast to his observation, however, a lot of attested examples exist (particularly in informal registers). With a number of actual sentences, I argue for the existence of this construction, pointing out that the construction under discussion requires a constructional, rather than purely morphosyntactic, analysis. First, slightly modifying Hirose’s (1999) inheritance model, I claim that the construction at issue is not a “static” construction but emerges (on-line) from the JB-X DM-Y construction via analogy. This conclusion leads to another argument that while the JB-X DM-Y construction is well entrenched (cf. Hilpert, 2005), the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not. This straightforwardly accounts for the latter’s substandard nature and supports the usage-based model of grammar.

Hirose (1999) analyzes the clausal JB-X DM-Y construction (ex.3: *Just because I’m a linguist, it doesn’t mean that I speak many languages*) as a subpart of the inferential because-clause construction (ex.4: *It must have rained, because the ground is wet*), and the latter as being related to the causal because-clause construction (ex.5: *the ground is wet because it has rained*) by a metaphorical mapping. In this paper, I consider the clause JB-X DM-Y construction to inherit its information directly from the causal because-clause construction (i.e., the inferential because-clause construction is not relevant), for the following reasons. First, the focusing adverb *just* may focalize causal because-clauses, but not inferential ones. Second, causal because-clauses may be within the scope of matrix negation, just like the because-clause of the JB-X DM-Y construction, whereas inferential ones may not. Third, unlike causal because-clauses, inferential ones do not appear in sentence-initial position without a lexicalized inference marker in the main clause, such as *I think* (ex. 6: *Because the ground is wet, *(I think) it has rained*). Kanetani (2007) argues that the interpretation of this sentence is coerced into the causal one due to the sentence form; i.e., ex. 6 is an instance of the causal because-clause construction. As with ex. 6, the clausal JB-X DM-Y construction (ex. 3) can be viewed as a kind of causal because-clause construction, given that the because-clause precedes its main clause with the lexicalized counter-inference marker doesn’t mean (cf. Bender & Kathole, to appear). Then, the JBo-X DM-Y construction is created by the analogy that casual because-clauses may be nominalized as because of NP (ex. 7: *The ground is wet because of the rain vs. *It has rained, because of the wet ground*). This analogy is motivated not only by functional similarities between the because-clause and the because of phrase used in the constructions at issue but also by their formal similarities; i.e., they share the same lexeme because. This is verified by a crosslinguistic analysis. That is, English allows such a specific construction as (ex. 1) because both formal and functional conditions are met in the language.

Thus, the existence of the JBo-X DM-Y construction can be accounted for by an analogy that is motivated by (i) the entrenchment of the JB-X DM-Y construction and (ii) the functional and formal similarities between the because-clause used in the JB-X DM-Y construction and because of phrases.