Department of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy

Michelle Montague (University of Bristol)

Fri, October 21, 2011 | WAG 316

3:30 PM - 5:00 PM


"Conscious Thought"

In this paper, I ask the question ‘What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought?’ I first argue that the notion of ‘access-consciousness’ cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we must appeal to phenomenological properties. If this is right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required.  Can conscious occurrent thought be accounted for solely in terms of sensory phenomenology, including both verbal and non-verbal imagery?  I argue that the answer is ‘no’, and that we must appeal to what is now often called ‘cognitive phenomenology’ to say what distinguishes conscious occurrent thought from non-conscious occurrent thought.

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