Department of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy

Adam Pautz accepts position as Assistant Professor

Sat, January 1, 2005

Many of his interests center around sensory consciousness and the secondary qualities. He accepts (with some qualifications) a form of Internalist Intentionalism about experience, and argues on broadly empirical grounds for a primitivist position concerning sensory representation and the secondary qualities. His papers include "An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of Resemblance between Universals" (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1997), "Have Byrne and Hilbert Answered Hardin's Challenge?"’ (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2003), and "Externalist Intentionalism and Neurobiology: An Empirical Problem"’ (forthcoming in Nous).

He is on leave for the 2004/2005 academic year in order to work with David Chalmers on the research project "The Contents of Consciousness" at the Australian National University. His webpage provides links to his papers and describes his work in greater detail.

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